Control familiar y calidad del resultado
Family control and earnings quality
Resumen
El trabajo analiza la relación entre el control familiar y la calidad de la información contable en un contexto en el que el tradicional conflicto de agencia entre directivos y accionistas se desplaza a la divergencia de intereses entre accionistas controladores y minoritarios. Los resultados alcanzados muestran que, en comparación con las no familiares, las empresas de naturaleza familiar divulgan unos resultados de mayor calidad, tanto en términos de menores ajustes por devengo discrecionales como de mayor capacidad de los componentes actuales del resultado para predecir los cash flows futuros. Además, el aumento en los derechos de voto en manos de la familia controladora incrementa la calidad de los resultados contables. La evidencia obtenida se muestra consistente con la presencia de un efecto reputación/vinculación a largo plazo asociado a la empresa familiar. Adicionalmente, el trabajo refleja que a medida que disminuye la divergencia entre los derechos de voto y de cash flow en manos de la familia controladora, aumenta la calidad de la información contable.
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