Opciones sobre acciones y gestión de resultados en las empresas portuguesas cotizadas
Executive stock options and earnings management in the portuguese listed companies
Resumen
Teóricamente, las opciones sobre acciones para ejecutivos permiten alinear los intereses de la dirección con los de los accionistas. No obstante, los estudios anteriores han indicado que las opciones sobre acciones pueden provocar conflictos de intereses entre ejecutivos y accionistas (Jensen, 2005) y crear incentivos para la gestión de resultados (e.g. Jensen et al., 2004; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi et. al., 2007). Así, este trabajo examina las implicaciones de la atribución de opciones sobre acciones en la gestión de resultados. En particular, planteamos la siguiente pregunta: ¿La atribución de opciones sobre acciones induce la práctica de gestión de resultados? Utilizando una muestra de 33 empresas portuguesas no financieras cotizadas para el período 2003-2010, observamos que los ejecutivos son más propensos a la adopción de prácticas de gestión de resultados cuando poseen opciones sobre acciones. Consecuentemente, este estudio sugiere que las opciones sobre acciones no siempre eficaces para alinear los intereses de los ejecutivos con los de los propietarios de la compañía. De facto, las opciones sobre acciones parecen afectar negativamente la calidad de los resultados y, consecuentemente reducen la calidad y relevancia de los estados financieros publicados.
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