Efecto del gobierno corporativo en la probabilidad de fracaso empresarial: evidencia española
Corporate governance effect on financial distress likelihood: Evidence from Spain
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza algunos mecanismos de gobierno corporativo (propiedad y características del Consejo de Administración) en las empresas cotizadas españolas y su impacto sobre las probabilidades de fracaso empresarial. Usando la técnica del emparejamiento, se lleva a cabo un estudio empírico con 308 observaciones, la mitad de ellas fracasadas y la otra mitad no fracasadas entre 2007 y 2012. Sobre la base del estudio de Pindado et al. (2008), se ha usado un concepto amplio de fracaso empresarial. Empleando modelos logísticos condicionales, y adicionalmente a otros estudios previos sobre fracaso empresarial, nuestros resultados confirman que en situaciones de dificultad previas a la quiebra, la propiedad de los consejeros y la proporción de consejeros independientes ejercen un impacto similar sobre la probabilidad de fracaso empresarial a otras situaciones de fracaso más extremas. Nuestros resultados van más allá al evidenciar una relación negativa entre el tamaño del consejo y la probabilidad de fracaso empresarial. Interpretamos estos resultados como una forma de creación de diversidad y mejorar el acceso a la información y a los recursos, especialmente en contextos donde la propiedad está altamente concentrada y los grandes accionistas tienen un gran poder de influencia en la composición de la estructura del consejo. Sin embargo, los resultados confirman que la concentración de la propiedad no tiene un efecto significativo sobre la probabilidad de fracaso empresarial en el contexto español. Interpretamos que los accionistas mayoritarios son pasivos con respecto a una mayor vigilancia de la gestión y alterativamente, no tiene suficientes incentivos para frenar las dificultades financieras. Estos resultados tienen importantes implicaciones en el contexto español donde se han propuesto cambios en los requerimientos relativos al gobierno corporativo y donde no hay evidencia empírica a este respecto.
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