El estudio neurológico de la conciencia: una valoración crítica
Resumen
Durante el predominio, en ciencia cognitiva, del paradigma clásico simbólico-computacional no se prestó apenas atención al estudio neurobiológico de la conciencia. Con la aparición de los modelos conexionistas en los que se parte de una concepción más naturalizada y menos "abiológica" de la psicología, se dio un giro radical en la cuestión que nos ocupa. Desde esta corriente la explicación de los fenómenos mentales debe incluir necesariamente referencias al soporte biológico ya que se toma como modelo computacional el funcionamiento del sistema nervioso. Tras describir los trabajos de los neurocientíficos sobre los correlatos neuronales de la conciencia, analizamos desde una perspectiva crítica, las limitaciones y puntos débiles de los mismo referidas fundamentalmente a los problemas conceptuales del conexionismo, a las objeciones al localizacionismo, a las limitaciones de las técnicas de imagen cerebral, a la falta del establecimiento de relaciones causales cerebro-mente y a la pretensión exclusivista y reduccionista de la mayor parte de las investigaciones.Descargas
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