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## Problems of Systems with Mixed School Provision: Analysis of the Private Subsidized Network in Chile

Problemas de los Sistemas de Provisión Escolar Mixta: análisis de la red privada subvencionada en Chile

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### Abstract

*The Chilean education system is characterised by a type of mixed provision and the participation of the private sector in school provision, which is consolidated as the network with the largest enrolment in the country. However, the reasons behind its consolidation, its characteristics and the effects of its expansion on the organisation of school provision remain underrepresented in the education debate. It is therefore relevant to ask how the private subsidised network is composed and how its attributes interact with the institutional characteristics of school provision in a context of regulatory changes. The study focuses on what are the characteristics of schools, inquiring into the attributes of status recognised by families, the selectivity practices of schools and connecting with the broader discussion on mixed provision systems. For this purpose, an exploratory factorial technique is used to descriptively characterise the schools, considering the 906 schools in the Santiago Metropolitan Area. Among the main findings, the results are confirmatory with respect to the attributes theoretically linked to status in contexts of competition and school choice, highlighting that their traditional sources - the collection of fees, composition and performance - present a pattern of grouping and constitute a stable basis of status for schools. On the other hand, access selectivity practices interact more directly with demand for schooling, offering differentiation within higher status schools.*

*Keywords:* Reform, education policy, student choice, market, Chile

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## Resumen

*El sistema educativo chileno se caracteriza por un tipo de provisión mixta y la participación del sector privado en la provisión escolar, que se consolida como la red con mayor matrícula del país. No obstante, las razones que están en la base de su consolidación, sus características y cuáles son los efectos de su expansión en la organización de la provisión escolar permanecen subrepresentados en el debate educacional. Por esto, resulta relevante preguntarse cómo se compone la red privada subvencionada y cómo interactúan sus atributos con las características institucionales de la provisión escolar en un contexto de cambios regulatorios. El estudio se centra en cuáles son las características de los centros educativos, indagando en los atributos de estatus reconocido por las familias, las prácticas de selectividad de los centros conectando con la discusión más amplia sobre los sistemas de provisión mixta. Para este propósito, se utiliza una técnica factorial exploratoria que permite caracterizar descriptivamente los centros educativos, considerando para esto a los 906 establecimientos del Área Metropolitana de Santiago. Entre los principales hallazgos, los resultados son confirmatorios respecto de los atributos vinculados teóricamente a estatus en contextos de competición y elección escolar, destacando que sus fuentes tradicionales -el cobro de aranceles, composición y desempeño- presentan un patrón de agrupamiento y constituyen una base estable de estatus para las escuelas. Por otro lado, las prácticas de selectividad en el acceso interactúan más directamente sobre la demanda de escolaridad, ofreciendo una diferenciación al interior de escuelas de mayor estatus.*

*Palabras clave:* Reforma, política educacional, selección de estudiantes, mercado, Chile

## Introduction and objectives

In recent years, the private sector has acquired greater dynamism and relevance in the organisation of school provision at the global level (Verger et al., 2023). In mixed provision systems, education supply is organised on the basis of a network of public schooling and a network of subsidised private schools, and this design may serve various purposes, such as guaranteeing educational freedom, promoting equivalence between different types of schooling, stimulating competition or school autonomy (Zancajo et al., 2021a). In this way, policies that encourage private school funding benefit from hybrid schemes and are linked to substantive values such as academic freedom or ensuring educational diversity (Zancajo et al., 2021a).

Among the problems associated with mixed school provision, which are attracting increasing attention in both research and education policy, are the growing levels of school segregation, understood as an unequal distribution of students in the school network according to their ascriptive attributes such as gender, social origin or ethnicity (Bonal and Bellei, 2018). This trend is also linked to a 'dualisation' of school provision between a network of public schools and a network of subsidised private schools, with the former concentrating socially disadvantaged students with specific learning requirements (Zancajo et al., 2021a), which raises a number of questions regarding how school provision is composed in terms of ownership, school funding schemes, how school admission processes are organised, as well as the different levels of selectivity exercised by schools.

Finally, the degree of autonomy that schools have is also relevant in these contexts, considering that this tends to be associated with reforms oriented towards a logic based on accountability and the expansion of standardised tests (Pagès, 2021).

Following a growing cycle of social and student mobilisations (Aguilar and Álvarez, 2015; Donoso, 2012), Chile initiated a substantive discussion on its educational institutionality, giving way to a new reform policy aimed precisely at modifying the institutional rules that regulate the participation of the private sector in its institutional, financial and organisational components. There is controversy about the undesired effects of this school provision on the stratification of the education system and the legitimacy of private sector financing policies. Moreover, in practice, both the ability to capture family preference and to obtain academic results has been varied by this sector, giving way to strong differentiation within it (Carrasco and Gedda, 2022). Thus, the most salient feature of private subsidised provision has been its increasing atomisation and socio-economic segmentation (Bonal et al., 2014, 2016).

In light of the above, it is relevant to ask how the network of private subsidised schools is composed and how its attributes interact with the practices of selectivity in school provision in a context of regulatory changes. Since 2015, education policy has been promoting a free schooling regime that seeks to replace family fees in private subsidised provision with a greater public contribution, in order to increase equity and inclusion in education. The aim of this article is to specifically explore the characteristics of schools and how they are related to the ways in which they are linked to educational policy, investigating the attributes linked to the status recognised by families and the practices of school selectivity. Finally, we seek to connect these results to the broader discussion on how schools are linked to regulatory changes in terms of equity. For this purpose, we use a quantitative design based on the use of the exploratory factorial technique, which allows for a descriptive characterisation of the schools, analysing their communalities, considering the 906 private subsidised schools in the Metropolitan Area of Santiago de Chile.

## **Subsidised education**

The Chilean education system is characterised by a type of mixed provision and the formation of a network of subsidised private schools that has consolidated itself as the main schooling offer. This sector has grown significantly over the last forty years, achieving an important level of institutionalisation and prestige in the education system. Although there is relevant evidence on the configuration of private subsidised provision and the problems of mixed provision systems (Corvalán et al., 2009; Bellei, 2015; Carrasco & Honey, 20, Carrasco, 2022; Carrasco and Gedda, 2022; Gutierrez, 2023), what are the effects of its expansion on the stratification of schools remains underrepresented in the educational debate.

This type of school provision was established as a result of a set of structural reforms to the education system in 1981 that gave way to a dynamic of growth in private provision (Bellei, 2015; Bellei and Muñoz, 2021; Zancajo, 2019). This dynamism was promoted by the implementation of a competitive per capita funding scheme for universal demand, which generated strong incentives to attract the private sector through the creation of schools -

or their incorporation into the subsidy regime, especially those linked to religious congregations - which, based on this, are financed on the basis of a social demand criterion.

For this purpose, the institutional design defined a common framework for public and private subsidised schools, through subsidies to families, and guaranteeing a context of school choice. While families do not directly receive the subsidy, resources are allocated to schools on the basis of a calculation combining enrolment and student attendance. At the same time, this regulatory framework provided ample capacity for private subsidised schools to establish non-centralised forms of school admissions and to exercise compulsory charges to families, both of which are defined by the schools themselves and their administrators.

In Chile, as of 2020, private subsidised provision is made up of 4,566 educational providers and 5,684 schools, representing 54.5% of the national school enrolment. From the point of view of the characteristics of the administrators, 73.4% of them manage single establishments, while 22.7% are organised as conglomerates that manage between 2 and 9 establishments and 4.7% of the providers manage more than 10 schools (Mineduc 2020 databases) and are mainly composed of religious congregations, but also trade unions, foreign colonies or schools created by founding teachers.

The private subsidised sector shows two main cycles of growth. The first phase took place between 1982 and 1990, a period in which it went from representing 19.6% to 32.4% of enrolment, doubling the number of schools. By 1990, the sector was close to 3,000 schools in the country. This trend moderated at the beginning of the 1990s to give way to a second growth process at the end of the decade. Private subsidised provision was consolidated as the majority of school provision in 2006, reaching a coverage of over 50% of school enrolment.

Policies aimed at strengthening the participation of the private sector in school provision have developed strongly as a global phenomenon over the last forty years (Zancajo et al., 2021b), either through the direct management of schools or the provision of goods and services that support their activities. The legitimacy of these policies of financing private provision, the conditions of access to the subsidy regime, as well as the specific regulations that these schools must comply with, have been part of the controversies faced by this type of policies.

Thus, the formation of subsidised private schools complicates the traditional distinction between a mass public sector and a traditional private sector oriented exclusively to elites. The criteria most commonly used to define their type of ownership have been the ownership structure of the schools, their main source of funding, the management models they adopt or the type of regulations to which they are subject (Zancajo et al., 2021a). This diversity of criteria poses a complexity for education policy and recognises the different dimensions that can be addressed by regulators' initiatives. Thus, private schools that receive public funding tend to be associated with greater demands and accountability than private schools that would be funded exclusively by family contributions (Zancajo et al., 2021b).

Also, what are the persistent effects of the expansion of subsidised private provision on the social stratification of education systems and the transmission of educational inequality (Zancajo et al., 2021b).

In this sense, the Chilean case confirms concerns about increasing school segregation and segmentation of school provision (Almonacid, 2004; Corvalán and García-Huidobro, 2015; Valenzuela et al. 2010; Huneus, 2011; Elacqua et al. 2011; 2013; Carrasco et al. 2014).

## **Literature Review**

The literature review highlights that, in contexts of mixed provision, especially those anchored in the dynamics of competition and school choice, schools interact in an attempt to capture the preference of families through a complex web of interdependence (Jabbar, 2015, 2016; Woods, 2000). This factor influences the configuration of educational provision and sets the edges on which schools' responsiveness to competitive pressure is organised.

The definition of the dynamics of competition consists of the process through which different schools strive to capture the preference of families by deploying a series of material and symbolic resources, although as Woods (2000) warns, this definition will require some refinement. This is because, although there are structural aspects that act on school provision such as demographics and the socio-economic condition of the context, the logics that schools develop are contingent on their beliefs and orientations (Levacic, 2004).

In contexts of competition and school choice, as has been the case in Chile, students and their families may strategically opt for schools with higher status attributes without considering only their academic performance (Boeskens, 2016). There is consistent evidence that differences in students' learning opportunities and performance on standardised tests are related to differences in the socio-economic composition of schools (Harker and Tymms, 2004; OECD, 2009).

In statistical terms, this relationship is referred to as the 'composition effect' and assumes that aggregate school-level variables are linked to the socio-economic characteristics of families, and these characteristics make a specific contribution to explaining the variance observed in educational outcomes, once the same variable at the individual level is controlled for (Harker and Tymms, 2004).

Furthermore, as highlighted by the OECD (2009) on the basis of the international PISA tests, these socio-economic characteristics of families remain the single factor that most directly explains the variability of educational outcomes. This effect is explained precisely because the way students are assigned to schools is not random but depends on the institutional characteristics of education systems, and how families' preferences are expressed (Bellei and Trivelli, 2014). Therefore, the characteristics of regulatory contexts such as the types of provision, the selectivity of access or the way in which enrolment is allocated to schools are relevant for the objectives of equity and cohesion of education systems. Other less considered aspects, but also relevant in terms of equity, are the type of grouping of students within schools, their transitions from different educational routes or the degree of exclusion in education systems (Zancajo et al., 2021b).

In this framework, it is relevant to ask about the composition of the status attributes that families recognise and how these interact with other institutional features such as school selectivity or demand for schooling. The perspective adopted in this study is that the status of schools is diffuse in nature, in the sense that it does not strictly depend on a precise judgement or a directly observable attribute. Unlike other sensitive characteristics

highlighted by families in school choice, such as affordability, infrastructure or timetable extension, status needs to be addressed indirectly through other interrelated aspects.

In this sense, the research hypothesis is that the traditional sources of status for schools are theoretically associated with a set of characteristics such as the presence of compulsory charges to families, performance on standardised tests and the socio-economic composition of the school (Jabbar, 2015, 2016). However, it is not clear how these elements interact with each other or how they are associated with other features of institutional design such as the presence of school selectivity, demand behaviour or families' assessment of various aspects of the school, which is explored more specifically in the following sections.

It is relevant to analyse how these attributes interact, since in selective contexts, admission mechanisms could not only exclude an undesirable type of students but also allow schools to indirectly increase their capacity to attract a profile of students apparently favourable to school choice based on a second-order competition dynamic (Verger et al., 2016), introducing a greater social stratification and reinforcing a distribution where students with greater resources are concentrated in schools with others of similar characteristics, enhancing the so-called *composition effect*.

In the Chilean context, school selectivity has been conceptualised mainly as a barrier to non-discriminatory access to education and as a critical factor in the increase of school segregation (Bellei et al., 2010; Godoy et al., 2014), being one of the most controversial aspects in the education policy debate during the recent period (Bellei et al., 2010).

From a regulatory point of view, student selection has been regulated since 2009 as established in articles 12, 13 and 14 of the General Education Law (LGE), but as it depends on autonomous processes in schools, these practices are opaque to the law. The regulation proposed by the LGE prohibits school selection from first to sixth grade of primary education, but by recognising the prerogative of schools to have an Institutional Education Project (PEI) that must be adhered to by families, it is ambivalent, especially in the case of schools where the demand for enrolment exceeds their admission quotas.

Taking this background into consideration, selectivity in access is understood as those practices and requirements that schools establish during the admission process according to what the families themselves declare. As detailed in the following table, these practices linked to selectivity in access, in turn, can be associated with value-based and academic aspects and those more oriented to identifying the socio-economic characteristics of families (Godoy et al., 2014).

Table 1

*Classification of the types of requirements associated with selectivity*

<b>Dimension</b>	<b>Selectividad Practice</b>
Value Aspects	Civil marriage certificate
	Certificate of baptism and/or church marriage
Academic Aspects	Pre-school education assessment*.
	Transcript of records from previous school*.
	The student was required to attend a play session. The student had to take a written examination or entrance test.

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Socio-economic aspects	Remuneration certificate Interview with families
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\* These requirements are excluded from the variable "selectivity" as they are used as an administrative requirement.

In this sense, school selectivity may be associated with different purposes and tends to be intensified in the processes of access to the most advanced cycles of education (Boeskens, 2016). In institutional contexts of greater discretion in school admission processes, there is an effect whereby private subsidised schools tend to prefer students with higher socio-economic status and academic skills in their composition - unless there are specific education policies aimed at promoting greater access and social mix - either because they are less costly to teach or because the socio-economic composition of the enrolment is a sensitive aspect in the choice of families, especially for those with middle or upper-middle income (Boeskens, 2016; OECD, 2012).

In the Chilean context, school selectivity has been a practice widely accepted by both schools and families (Treviño et al., 2004) despite evidence that it not only violates the enjoyment of the right to education but also generates greater segregation and undermines the basis for social cohesion (Contreras et al., 2011; González, 2017; Rojas, 2014, 2016; Treviño et al., 2014; Valenzuela et al., 2010).

## **Method**

### **Population and Sample**

Based on a review of secondary sources, a database was compiled that includes all private grant-aided schools according to the following sampling criteria:

- i. Only private grant-aided schools in operation as of 2020 are included (the available databases accumulate data from those schools that are closed, in the process of closure, in temporary recess or authorised without admission processes);
- ii. This includes schools that offer basic schooling, i.e. those that offer primary, secondary or both cycles, and that include only supplementary forms of pre-school, adult or specific learning requirements-oriented education in their different types;
- iii. Geographically, the sample is limited to the metropolitan area of Santiago, with 34 municipalities defined by criteria of geographical proximity.

Considering these criteria, the sample of schools results in 906 private subsidised (or grant-aided) schools distributed in 34 communes of the Santiago Metropolitan Area. This group represents 22.54% of the private subsidised provision in number of schools at national level.

To estimate inter-annual variability, the procedure was iterated for each base in the period 2013-2020 using the previous year as a parameter. In this way, it is possible to establish the performance trajectories of schools and educational providers (Carrasco and Gedda, 2022) from the point of view of changes in ownership, evolution of practices associated with selectivity, co-payment brackets they exercise, enrolment trends and their

results in standardised tests.

### Instrument

The instrument consisted of a principal component factor analysis that included the variables described in the following section. A first step consisted of reducing the dimensionality of the data and identifying grouping patterns or communalities through the distribution of school attributes, following the guidelines proposed by the methodological literature for this type of analysis (Pallant, 2020; Straits and Singleton, 2011). Once this procedure has been carried out, the result offers a four-component solution that was grouped into the concepts of status, selectivity in access, family valuation and trends associated with school enrolment.

The data are then decomposed into cross-sections by classifying schools into sextiles based on a scale of status attributes, and bivariate and multivariate statistical association tests are performed. In this way, each segment grouped 151 schools and their correlation with selectivity practices and other traits was estimated from different statistical analysis tests. This strategy was adopted considering both the heterogeneity and segmentation that characterise school provision (Bonal et al., 2016; Verger et al. 2016) and given that aggregate analysis hides significant differences in terms of how school characteristics are composed and related.

### Data collection and analysis procedure

The analysis benefits from the data provided by the School Admission System (SAE) available as of 2019 and from the official databases of the Chilean Ministry of Education through its Open Data platform (<https://datosabiertos.mineduc.cl/>). The databases were consolidated into a matrix from the ordering of the variables, which was then processed in SPSS v.23 software. The following table summarises the table of the main variables used in the principal component analysis and subsequent bivariate statistical analysis:

Table 2

#### Study Variables

Name	Description	Measurement
Registration	Trend associated with enrolment between the years 2013-2020	Climb
Tranche Co-payment	Threshold of the monthly household charge expressed in brackets according to official classification	Ordinal
Amount Co-payment	Amount of monthly charge to the family	Climb
Priority Concentration	Percentage of priority students in the enrolment of the school	Climb
SIMCE results	Standardised test scores in language and mathematics	Climb
Selectivity	Average aggregate frequency of access selectivity practices	Climb



Variation	Net and percentage change in enrolment and participation of students from the 40% most vulnerable.	Climb
Assessment of families	The data from the surveys carried out on families are collected, taking 2015 as a reference year.	Climb

The data associated with the behaviour of demand are extracted from the School Admission System (SAE) for the year 2019 and make it possible to quantify the volume of demand associated with the educational centres. The following variables are defined for this purpose:

- (a) Vacancies: number of places voluntarily declared by the school for the school year at different levels.
- (b) Net Demand: number of household preferences that include the school without prioritisation, but by mention among their preferences.
- (c) 1st Preference: Preferences that include school as first priority.
- (d) Surplus: difference between vacancies and net demand.

The selectivity of schools is limited to those practices and requirements for access to schools reported by families in the surveys associated with the SIMCE tests (see appendix). Based on this, a set of variables was designed for each year, producing a synthetic index that expresses the average cumulative frequency of the practices and requirements that schools organise for admission processes.

In order to approximate the relative status of the schools, the principal component analysis technique was used, and grouping patterns were identified between the different variables described from their correlation matrix. Subsequently, their relationship with practices linked to selectivity in the Metropolitan Area of Santiago (906 cases) is analysed.

### Results and discussion

When performing the principal components factor analysis, one aspect to highlight is that the matrix clearly differentiates sets of variables that can be organised as follows: those referring to selectivity practices in school access; those linked to families' assessment of different aspects of the school; those theoretically related to status (co-payment, social composition and test performance); and those elements related to the volume of enrolment and priority students.

Table 3

*Factor loadings from PCA*

Construct	Dimension and Indicators	Components			
		1	2	3	4
Selectivity practices	Academic Selectivity	,998			
	Socio-economic selectivity	,998			

	Selectivity Value Aspects	,997
	General Selectivity	,994
Assessment of families	Assessment of Learning	-1,000
	Demand Assessment	-1,000
	SEN* Guidance Assessment	-1,000
Status attributes	Simce Mathematics Results	,885
	Priority Student Concentration	-,840
	Simce Language Results	,779
	Co-payment amount	,748
Enrolment trend and volume	Priority Students	,950
	Registration	,914

Note: Extraction method: Principal component analysis. Rotation method: Oblimin Normalisation with Kaiser. \* SEN: Special Educational Needs.

For the purposes of this study, the discussion of the results will focus on the constructs of status and selectivity (components 1 and 3), understood as critical aspects for a system of mixed provision. The notion of status attributes is operationalised on the basis of the latent construct of monthly charges or fees, performance on standardised tests and the socio-economic composition of the enrolment, estimated from the concentration of students from the lowest 40% of socio-economic families. As can be seen in factor loading Table 3, these traits tend to have a strong statistical association and are grouped as a component independent of other indicators.

The presence of access selectivity practices correlates strongly with each other and is not statistically associated with other attributes such as the socio-economic composition of the school. From the analysis of school access requirements, it is possible to establish that the private subsidised sector is not inherently selective but is contingent on status attributes and demand for schooling. On the other hand, selectivity practices in school access are not directly assimilated to this pattern, but rather constitute a grouping factor in itself, which is heterogeneous and complexly linked to traditional status sources in the school.

This definition is relevant for estimating the linkage of schools to the education policy context. In the following, correlation tests are presented to estimate the relationship between the status dimension and the orientation of schools to the replacement of family fees in school provision:

Table 4

Contingency Table status and end of co-payment attributes

Status* Status* Status* Status	Status* Status* Status* Status*	Status* Status* Status* Status*	Status* Status* Status* Status*	Co-payment	Replaces Co-payment
Section 1				142	9
Section 2				82	60
Section 3				44	107
Tranche 4				53	98
Section 5				69	82
Section 6				102	49
Total				492	414

\*The tranches are ordered in descending order, tranche 1 centres are those with the highest concentration of status attributes.

Table 5

Chi-Square Statistical Association Test attributes of status and co-payment status

	Value	GI	Asymptotic sign (bilateral)
Pearson's Chi-square	241.214 <sup>a</sup>	5	.000**
Likelihood ratio	271.328	5	.000**
N of valid cases	737		

a: 0 cells (0.0%) have an expected frequency of less than 5. The minimum expected frequency is 29.36; \*\*: Statistical significance at *p-value* <0.01.

As shown in Tables 4 and 5, statistical tests at the categorical level reveal the presence of an association between the status variables and co-payment replacement in that schools with moderate status tend more directly to replace co-payment. When coded at the ordinal level, the correlation between selectivity practices and status attributes at a 99% confidence interval is proportional and of moderate intensity, showing a Spearman correlation coefficient of .374 with a *p-value* of <0.01.

Table 6 Contingency Table attributes of status and selectivity

Status	Selectividad internships					
	Section 1	Section 2	Section 3	Tranche 4	Section 5	Section 6
Section 1	64	37	20	10	14	6
Section 2	38	36	30	23	15	9
Section 3	11	29	28	38	22	23
Tranche 4	13	19	30	30	36	23
Section 5	17	19	26	28	27	34

Section 6	8	11	17	22	37	56
Total	151	151	151	151	151	151

Table 7 Test of Statistical Association between Status Attributes and Selectivity

	Value	G1	Asymptotic sign (bilateral)
Pearson's Chi-square	103.857 <sup>a</sup>	5	.000**
Likelihood ratio	107.530	5	.000**
N of valid cases	737		

<sup>a</sup>. 0 cells (0.0%) have an expected frequency of less than 5. The minimum expected frequency is 40.76; \*\*: Statistical significance at *p-value* <0.01.

### Cross-cutting analysis: Status versus selectivity

Once the status and selectivity components were identified, the sample was broken down for cross-sectional analysis, grouping schools into sextiles. At the same time, correlations were analysed using statistical significance tests. In order to establish more clearly the implications of these correlations, the average frequency of access selectivity practices was estimated with the status attributes grouped for each section.

Regarding the relationship between status and the behaviour of demand, the following table details how the magnitude of demand is distributed in relation to the vacancies declared by schools, either as a named preference or as a first priority expressed by families:

Table 6

*Correlation Coefficients by Status and demand behaviour*

Section Status	Selectivity		Offer (average)	Demand (averages)		
	Pearson Correlation	Index	Vacancies	Net	1st Preference	Surplus
Section 1	0.3168	3.451	102.25	388.57	90.97	286.31
Section 2	0.2705	3.120	115.84	313.62	73.91	197.76
Section 3	0.2433	2.715	116.90	239.28	67.51	12.37
Tranche 4	0.0703	2.685	114.02	175.62	46.21	61.58
Section 5	0.1596	2.646	131.18	142.12	38.19	10.93
Section 6	-0.2018	2.384	106.82	106.57	26.54	-0.25

Note: Statistical significance at *p-value* <0,05

The scores associated with the vacancy, net demand, preference and surplus columns correspond to the average value in each status bracket, while the selectivity score expresses the cumulative frequency of selectivity-associated practices reported by households. The test of statistical significance based on Pearson's correlation coefficient was applied to the

status variables and access selectivity practices (1st column). In the higher status brackets the relationship is statistically significant and directly proportional, while it loses intensity of association in the lower brackets. In terms of the demand for schooling, while the number of places in schools is equivalent, as is to be expected given the size of the schools, those with high status systematically show a higher demand in net terms, as a first preference and therefore a surplus of demand with respect to places.

## **Conclusions**

The contribution of this article has been to explore specifically how the dimensions of selectivity in access and traditional status attributes interact in the organisation of subsidised private provision in the Metropolitan Area of Santiago. For this purpose, the construct of status recognised by families and the practices of selectivity in access to schools are operationalised.

Among the main findings, it is confirmed that the attributes theoretically linked to status - tariffs, composition and performance - present a clustering pattern and constitute a stable source of prestige for schools, as the literature warns, although the way in which these dimensions interact is more complex than expected. These features define a kind of anchorage for schools at the local level and the orientations it develops towards the dynamics of competitive interdependence with other schools.

This is relevant, as it suggests that while moderate status schools have persistent difficulties in reversing cycles of institutional deterioration, high status schools systematically consolidate their advantage and benefit from an excess demand for schooling. Furthermore, in the higher status brackets, the relationship is statistically significant and directly proportional, while it loses intensity of association in the moderate status brackets.

On the other hand, the results suggest that access selectivity practices are not a good predictor of the socio-economic composition of schools, but the thresholds of compulsory co-payment to families are related to their status attributes. From the results obtained, it is possible to conclude that selectivity practices are not only reduced in schools located in areas of moderate status, this relationship becomes unstable given that it is not possible for schools to "offer" a relative status from the point of view of more homogeneous school environments and their efforts could aim at relieving those symbols of traditional prestige although these are more difficult to mobilise in short periods of time.

Finally, these results warn about the limitations faced by reform processes in mixed provision systems. In this sense, it is possible to note a weakening of the link between private subsidised schools and education policies that seek to increase the equity of the education system, especially those that concentrate greater attributes of status and, therefore, whose financing depends more directly on charges to families. Education policies need to address more directly this heterogeneity and the breadth of contexts it presents.

This case study highlights that the response of schools to new regulatory requirements can be very diverse, which opens up a line of enquiry as to how equity-oriented education policies could directly confront the principle of family autonomy in contexts of school choice, and especially those who have opted for such provision, putting at risk the adherence and capacity to sustain reform processes.

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## Appendices

### Table Appendices

*Type of requirement and year in which the household survey is consulted.*

<b>Requirement/Year</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2017</b>
Early childhood education assessment	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth certificate	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Civil marriage certificate	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Transcript of records from previous school	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Certificate of baptism and/or church marriage	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Remuneration certificate	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interview with parents	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
The student had to attend a play session	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
The student had to take a written exam or entrance test.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Repetition	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Psychological or behavioural report	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Another requirement	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No

Source: Own elaboration based on data from SIMC surveys E.