



Referential Metonymy across Languages: What Can Cognitive Linguistics and CONTRASTIVE LINGUISTICS Learn from each Other?

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"There are some more or less correct places in your translation," said the English teacher to a student. "Otherwise everything is wrong in your very bad work."

"But what are those good places?" asked the unhappy student.

"The names of people and cities," explained the teacher.

ABSTRACT

The paper demonstrates how contrastive linguistics may receive a fresh breath of life from approaching certain problems from the cognitive linguistic point of view. Cognitive linguistics is not only capable of providing contrastive linguistics with a comprehensive but coherent theoretical backbone the latter has always badly needed for its survival, but it is also certain to open up new avenues of research that have so far been more or less out of bounds for contrastive linguistics. At the same time, contrastive linguistics may play a critical, catalytic role in the development of cognitive linguistics theory and methodology. This is due to its immense potential in validating or falsifying some claims put forward by cognitive linguistics, which is inherently biased towards stressing the more universal aspects of language. This mutual cross-fertilization is demonstrated on the example of metonymically used names of capitals in English, German, Croatian and Hungarian.

KEYWORDS: metonymic mappings, referential metonymy, topic continuity, translational equivalence, quantitative contrastive analysis, proper noun, prepositional phrase, apposition.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Proper names, ranging from names of people to names of places to names of events and to names of products, such as the ones illustrated below, have always been of very limited importance for contrastive linguistics, and have never been the subject matter of any serious contrastive research, with a notable exception of an attempt in Kalisz (1983):

- (1)
- a. The-the other important joke for me is one that's, uh, usually attributed to Groucho Marx. but I think it appears originally in Freud's wit and its relation to the unconscious. And it goes like this-I'm paraphrasing: Uh ... "I would never wanna belong to any club that would have someone like me for a member."
 - b. China's vice-president, Hu Jin-tao, remarked on his first visit to Washington, DC, that "trouble" over Taiwan could set back improvements in relations between *America* and China.
 - c. As you know, in the *Cold War*, the department had one vision of what they were which was largely a mirror image of the active force.
 - d. These days, psychiatrists primarily treat O.C.D. with selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors, like Prozac and Luvox, which alleviate not only its symptoms but also the anxiety and depression that often accompany it.
 - e. As multiple births become less rare, the presumption that the parents are automatically entitled to a free lifetime supply of Pampers is beginning to erode.

The most obvious reason for such a state of affairs is that traditional contrastive analyses, due to their conceptual and methodological foundations (or still better, conceptual and methodological limitations) were not capable of approaching such phenomena in any sensible or interesting way, and its results would have been conspicuously trivial, to say the least.

As will be shown in the present paper, the phenomena in question may all of a sudden appear in a totally different light if we as contrastive linguists adopt a cognitive-functional perspective and embrace some fairly novel, even unconventional methodological procedures. Let us by way of illustration refer to work by Barcelona (in press) for some pioneering insights concerning a comprehensive treatment of proper names in cognitive linguistics, including their grammatical peculiarities as well. In other words, contrastive linguistics may receive a fresh breath of life from approaching problems from the cognitive linguistic point of view. Cognitive linguistics is not only capable of helping out contrastive linguistics from its present blind alley by providing a healthy theoretical platform the latter needs for its survival, but also by opening its eyes for new research issues that have not been within the compass of contrastive linguistics.

At the same time, contrastive linguistic research is an ideal ground for testing cognitive linguistic theory and methodology. Large bodies of data cognitive linguistics can handle bear

immense potential in validating or falsifying some claims put forward by cognitive linguistics, which has so far been predominantly biased towards stressing the more universal aspects of language. In other words, contrastive linguistics may play the corrective role of a linguistic devil's advocate, or that of a jack-in-the-box, constantly nudging cognitive linguistics back to a sound course.

II. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

Before we take a closer contrastive look at referential metonymies, we must provide in section III some background on how contrastive linguistics got where it presently sits. Section IV is a detailed contrastive case study of one specific type of referential metonymy, that of the CAPITAL-FOR-GOVERNMENT type.

We start there by first demonstrating the pitfalls of the classical contrastive analyses that were bound to cause researchers to default to a horizontal type of contrastive analysis, which includes among other things blind insistence on translation equivalence and corpus-restrictedness in the sense of Krzeszowski (1984). But if we adopt some alternative forms of *tertium comparationis* more suitable to the study of quantitative data, and if we enrich the notion of equivalence by adding text-linguistic and discourse-pragmatic dimensions to it, things start looking different. They particularly start looking different when viewed through a cognitive linguistic lens that makes visible various conceptual phenomena underlying the material under investigation as well as various ways in which they interact. We are then able to show that that same material whose cross-linguistic comparison first appeared as uninteresting, even tedious, is in fact a very rich contrastive hunting-ground. After uncovering a series of more or less subtle contrasts, we are in a position to relate them to certain cognitive factors but also to some structural ones, thus providing a holistic but cross-linguistically plausible picture.

In section V. we provide a summary of our findings and then briefly reflect on their theoretical and methodological relevance in the present context, i.e. we show how cognitive and contrastive linguistics can enrich each other and what they can learn from each other. There are some obvious gains for both, but some results of adopting a contrastive methodology in cognitive research may in fact produce some results that appear to be embarrassing for cognitive linguistics at large. We concentrate in that concluding section on some such findings and argue that they are a sort of blessing in disguise.

III. CONTRASTIVE LINGUISTICS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEMISE AND RE-EMERGENCE

It is part of common knowledge among linguists that there was a period of time when contrastive analysis, after peaking in the 60s and 70s, fell into disrepute. due to a number of reasons. First of all, the hopes that contrastive analysis would prove a cure-all for problems encountered in

language teaching were soon shattered. However, contrastive analysis failed on a more general descriptive and theoretical level too.

There were simply not enough coherent contrastive descriptions of larger chunks of linguistic systems cast within a single model, or at least compatible models, to sustain the contrastive paradigm for a prolonged period of time. These studies were only too literally contrastive *analyses*, i.e. they simply took apart their subject matter, which resulted in a series of more or less isolated contrastive statenients. If any sort of synthesis was attempted at all, it invariably boiled down to some pedagogically-oriented predictions, a considerable amount of which, if not actually falsified by error analyses, turned out to be either trivial or irrelevant for second/foreign language teaching. What was lacking in most of these classical contrastive undertakings was some sort of a unifying descriptive and explanatory account that would justify both the contrastive approach and the choice of a particular area of study as a real linguistic problem.

As pointed out by König (1992), towards the end of the 1980s, we witness a revival of interest in contrastive studies. König sees this as being in part related to a cross-fertilization of contrastive linguistics on the one hand, and the quest for universals, of both typological and generative provcnance, on the other hand. As far as the generative framework is concerned, its interest in contrastive data appears natural in view of the way generative models used to grow. They always started as deductive systems where universals were hard-wired at the very beginning. As the model grew it soon stretched the limits licensed by its initial assumptions while at the same time getting overstretched by real language data. In order to prevent its bursting at its seams, parametric outlets were allowed that saved the initial assumptions. Unfortunately, contrastive data were usually hand-picked in order to justify these modifications. In other words, a very narrow segment of data were looked at with a very specific goal in mind – not to test or challenge the model but to save it.

Informally speaking, this interest in contrastive data is the result and sign of any model's coming of age. Cognitive linguistics is in this respect no exception. After a two decades or so of dynamic growth, it is now already past the point at which diversification sets in. This diversification process can be observed at two levels. First, certain cognitive models emerge as more or less independent players, most conspicuously various brands of construction grammars. Secondly, cognitive linguistics is seeking vindication from various types of data coming from language acquisition, corpus linguistics, language typology, contact linguistics, and of course contrastive linguistics.

Contrastive linguistics is typically concerned with a detailed comparison of two languages. Language typology devotes itself to an investigation of a broader range of facts from a number of languages, and normally cannot go into details. It is, as Comrie (1986: 1155ff) and Birnbaum (1986: 1134) point out, possible to envisage a compromise approach, combining the strength of both approaches, i.e. concentrating on fewer languages and providing an in-depth study of a given phenomenon, while retaining the typological methodology and pursuing more

general objectives.

There has now been a steady flow of such studies enabling us to relate a number of logically independent similarities and difficulties to a more general framework unifying the observed facts, e.g. Hawkins (1986). However, such a typological underpinning of this sort of contrastive studies brings with itself the danger of a certain bias towards overemphasizing similarities between languages. We should also bear in mind that cognitive linguistics is also inherently biased towards overplaying universal tendencies.

Focussing on differences between languages, i.e. an attempt to motivate them, presents us with a different perspective and a more difficult task. Echoing the title of one of the sections in König (1992: 137), where he discusses avenues for the cross-fertilization of contrastive linguistics and typology, we could say that contrastive and cognitive linguistics can also cross-fertilize each other. Cognitive linguistics can provide contrastive studies with the necessary theoretical back-bone, stable enough due to its cumulativity. Quite specifically, it may help towards remedying such perennial problems as establishing equivalence and tertium comparationis (cf. Krzeszewski, 1986, on the potential of prototypes as TC) and providing unifying statements that motivate contrasts.

On the other hand, we note that during the period of its rapid diversification and expansion, cognitive linguistics has shared with typology the interest for universal phenomena, although receiving empirical support from just a handful of well-known and -studied languages, mainly from English. Testing its claims on a wider range of languages as well as from a contrastive linguistic perspective can not only provide a powerful vindication of cognitive linguistics as an open model, but may also warn of some loose ends as well as open new avenues of research. Last but not least, contrastive studies may reveal data that call for integration of the methodology and findings of various strands of cognitive linguistics.

IV. REFERENTIAL METONYMIES: HOW UNIVERSAL ARE THEY?

As already hinted at above, most problems for traditional contrastive research stemmed from the fact that they were organized horizontally, i.e. they started from a more or less language-particular phenomenon, a construction, category, etc., in one language and then tried to establish what their formal and/or semantic counterparts were in another language (or, more rarely, other languages). This is opposed to a vertical contrastive approach, which starts from a universal category, construction, etc. that is defined in a language-independent way, and then looks at how these are realized in any two or more languages.

Traditional horizontal contrastive studies were usually based on translation equivalence, i.e. their inputs were two parallel corpora containing a number of pairs of translationally equivalent utterances. We cannot go here into the details of the a priori limitations that this sort of procedure imposed on contrastive studies, but let us note that its shortcomings are made quite clear if one attempts to compare the use of proper nouns in various languages. In short, it would

be absurd and trivial to painstakingly pair a series of utterances with such nouns in different languages and then establish that a name corresponds to a name, i.e. that translationally equivalent utterances contain more or less correspondent names, with more or less of phonological and semantic adaptation, as the case might be. Of course, we also know that proper nouns are somewhat special regarding their grammatical behaviour: most tend to be either singular or plural; in languages like English the range of determiners they take is also severely restricted, notably the use of articles (definite, indefinite, zero).

The initial joke about the only good places in a student's translation being names of people and places implies that these are easy to "translate" as there is hardly any chance of mistranslating them because they are simply taken over from the source text into your target text, i.e. translation, without performing anything on them, apart from some minor cases of adaptation mentioned above. There is a widespread opinion in the objectivist tradition that proper names are 'outside' language, i.e. that they belong to the encyclopaedia rather than to the lexicon. Some philosophers and linguists even consider proper names to have no meaning or connotations. The consequence of this is that they are seen as both untranslatable and not to be translated. This means that a comparison of proper nouns based on translationally equivalent utterances would be a totally uninteresting endeavour. There is hardly any point in establishing that the English names *Hilton* and *Gulf Shores* in the following sentence from the novel *The Firm* by John Grisham unsurprisingly correspond to *Hilton* and *Gulf Shores*, respectively, in its published Croatian translation:

- (2) a. Since the *Hilton* is only ten miles from *Gulf Shores* along Highway 182, and since the only known escaped murderer was in the vicinity when the only violent crime occurred, the conclusion was quick and inescapable.
- b. S obzirom na to da je *Hilton* od *Gulf Shoresa* odvojen samo s petnaestak kilometara ceste broj 182, da se jedini poznati odbjegli robijaš našao u blizini baš kad se dogodio jedini nasilni delikt, zaključak je bio brz i neizbežan.

It does not take long to realize that in actual reality things may be very frequently very far from being that simple. If one is committed to the view, as cognitive linguists are, that there is no such sharp division between encyclopaedic and linguistic knowledge, and that meanings are far more flexible than objectivists would be prepared to admit, things start appearing in a very different light. And if we then also adopt a more appropriate methodology to look at cross-linguistic data we no longer see a boringly homogeneous picture but start noticing a series of more or less subtle contrasts that in the long run fit nicely into the whole picture.

In order to demonstrate this we now focus our attention on just a small subset of proper nouns, i.e. to the use of names of capitals of countries in English, German, Croatian and Hungarian. In addition to their primary use to refer to a certain location, e.g. in utterances specifying where a person lives, where a given building is situated, or where some event took

place, and such like, cognitive linguists have always been aware of a whole range of additional uses based on metonymic shifts (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, as an early inventory of various possibilities). Names of capitals are frequently used to refer to various political institutions, most notably to the institution invested with the executive political power, viz. the government of the country in question, as the capital is its official seat.

- (3) a. Why did this usually Europhile nation thumb its nose at *Brussels*, its own government and main political parties, its employers and trade unions, its bishops and farmers, and many forecasters too?
- b. At a recent Politburo-level meeting, according to versions reaching Washington, President Jiang Zemin counseled a low-key, cautious approach toward the new administration.
- c. If *Beijing* doesn't get anything substantial from Bush at the summit in Shanghai, such as a reaffirmation of U.S. support for the one-China policy; it might harden its policy toward *Washington* and Taiwan.

In addition to these, names of capitals can be found in metonymic uses that are also characteristic of other place names, i.e. to refer to branches of companies and museums, tribunals, stock exchanges, events, etc.

- (4) a. The Guggenheim operates a number of flourishing satellites in Venice, Berlin and, most recently, Bilbao, Spain. The latter has proved the most lucrative, but *Berlin* is also very successful.
- b. *Arusha* depends mostly on witnesses for evidence, many of them illiterate farmers who could not record their impressions at the time. The *Hague* enjoys intelligence intercepts from western armies, satellite photographs and other high-tech methods of collecting more durable evidence.
- c. *Kuala Lumpur* rose by 6.1% on optimism about prospects for Malaysia.
- d. The risk is that scattered American units would find themselves fighting multiple mini-*Mogadishus*.
- e. So what sort of NATO will emerge after *Prague*?

If this way of using names of capitals is very wide-spread in the world's languages, and if there are no significant problems in providing translation equivalents of these names in their primary use, we might expect that there ought to be no significant contrasts between languages, i.e. a translational equivalent of a sentence containing a metonymically used capital in one language is bound to also have a metonymically used counterpart. In other words, we would expect no significant differences across languages concerning the availability of either primary

or metonymic uses of capital names.

This seems to be in agreement with the view currently prevalent among cognitive linguists. Much of the recent research into the cross-linguistic availability of various types of metonymies seems to indicate that referential metonymies, in a marked contrast to predicational ones, are relatively unconstrained, so that most subtypes of the former are attested almost universally (cf. Panther & Thornburg, 1999; Brdar & Brdar-Szabó 2003).

However, we should beware of the dangers of relying on translational equivalence between constructed and/or isolated examples, no matter how perfect the match otherwise might be between individual lexical items and grammatical constructions. To use a metaphor, a dish of meat is objectively a dish of meat for anyone eating it, but the folk wisdom has it that one man's meat is another man's poison. In other words, words and constructions may nominally be the same but their discourse-pragmatic effect may be different in a different context of use.

In order to avoid the fallacy of translational equivalence in the horizontal contrastive approach we first propose to take a look at how referential metonymies of the type CAPITAL-FOR-GOVERNMENT are used in corpora that are not parallel in the sense of being translationally equivalent, but that are otherwise parallel in terms of their being of comparable length and containing authentic texts of the same genre and belonging to the same register. The texts in question were news articles (but not leaders or commentaries) from foreign/international sections of daily newspapers with national circulation. According to Krzczowski (1984: 306):

“It is perfectly possible to conduct CASs of texts which are *not* translations. Various kinds of *quantitative* CASs can be performed on texts in two or more languages without the initial prerequisite that the compared texts should be translations (...).”

Obviously the relation of statistical equivalence that is based on the assumption that the constituent texts contain certain similar elements, as described below, serves here as the *tertium comparationis*.

"Authentic" means here that the texts included are not translations but are produced by native speakers of a given language for other members of the same linguistic community without any particular textual prompt or model originally composed in another language. In other words, we had 4 corpora of authentic texts, or one independent corpus for each of the four languages involved.

The corpora were also parallel in another important sense. For the reasons outlined above, we did not wish to check for equivalence in a word-for-word, or sentence-by-sentence fashion. However, in order to make the four corpora roughly comparable in terms of reference, we decided to sample articles on five randomly chosen weekdays in the period between September 18, 2001, and May 16, 2003, which we believe should ensure that there is a high degree of overlap concerning the events reported.

The picture that emerged from our comparison of the type and token frequency of the metonymic use of capital names in the four corpora is somewhat surprising from the point of

view of the position widely held by cognitive linguists, as described above. Our counts do not call into question the universality of this type of metonymy but there are significant differences between languages. Cf. the data in table 1. We present both the absolute data in terms of types and tokens, as well as in a normalized form, giving the frequency of tokens normalized to the standard basis per 1,000 words.

Language	Papers	Subcorpus size (number of words)	CAPITAL-FOR-GOVERNMENT-metonymy		
			Tokens		types
			In absolute numbers	Number of tokens per 1,000 words	
<i>English</i>	Financial Times Guardian	46,067	128	2.77	18
<i>German</i>	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Süddeutsche Zeitung	52,283	130	2.48	21
<i>Croatian</i>	Vjesnik Večernji list	32,681	61	1.86	14
<i>Hungarian</i>	Népszabadság Magyar Nemzet	32,977	54	1.60	14

Table 1: The use of CAPITAL-FOR-GOVERNMENT metonymy in international news in English, German, Croatian and Hungarian daily newspapers

It is quite easy to see that the density of the metonymy in question in this particular text type is highest for English, followed by German, and Croatian and Hungarian lagging far behind. It is intriguing that this metonymy should be conspicuously underused in some languages under certain circumstances, both in terms of types and in terms of the absolute number of tokens.

We are well aware of the fact that there are apparently many factors at play here, some of which are of conceptual and cultural nature. For example, we noted a marked tendency to avoid in Croatian and Hungarian papers the metonymic use of their respective capital, Zagreb and Budapest. We surmise that in some communities journalists are not so ready to use the name of the capital of their own country in this way, while they often refer to other countries' governments in this way due to the predominant cultural model of perspective and the expression of the empathy towards the authority in question, or its lack. We assume that what makes possible this way of marking the perspective and expression of empathy is a variant of the conceptual metaphor EMOTIONAL DISTANCE IS DISTANCE IN PHYSICAL SPACE.

However, even if we consider such and other conceptual and cultural factors, the differences we are left with do not at all seem to be too random or insignificant. We would like to claim that they are in part due to the typological givens of the language under study, i.e. that they can be motivated by some already existing structural facts that may (but need not) in turn

be motivated by some deeper conceptual factors.

It was fortunate that our corpus contained a number of texts in different languages dealing with the same event. This made it possible to observe an interesting pattern of replacement of referential metonymies that is quite frequent in Croatian and Hungarian, when compared to English, or German. Where English, and frequently German, articles had clear instances of the CAPITAL-FOR-GOVERNMENT metonymy functioning as subject the other two languages have non-subject locative expressions; in Croatian this is realized as a prepositional phrase, and in Hungarian as an adpositional phrase. This pattern is illustrated in the following examples:

- (5) *Iz Londona* je službeno zanijekano da je krajnje
 from London-GEN AUX officially denied that AUX ultimate
 odredište tankera bio Gibraltar, Sto je prije
 destination tanker-GEN been Gibraltar which AUX earlier
 objavljeno.
 made public
 'It was officially denied in London that the ship's ultimate destination was Gibraltar,
 contrary to what had been claimed earlier'
- (6) *Moszkvában* most úgy látják, ...
 Moscow-in now thus consider-3PL
 'Moscow now thinks...'

This sort of replacement would have most likely gone unobserved if we had stuck to the traditional translation equivalence, as literal word-for-word equivalents always seem to be possible, though actually underused, in Croatian and Hungarian. In other words, English and German sentences containing straightforward metonymies like these:

- (7) Paris is very cautious about the deal.
 (8) Paris ist sehr vorsichtig angesichts des Geschäfts.

can always be translated into Croatian and Hungarian in both the following ways:

- (9) a. Paris je vrlo oprezan glede pogodbe.
 Paris is very cautious about deal-GEN
 b. U *Parizu* su oprezniji glede pogodbe.
 In Paris-LOC COP-3PL cautious-3PL about deal-GEN
- (10) a. *Párizs* nagyon óvatos az üzlettel kapcsolatban.
 Paris very cautious DEF deal-with concerning
 b. *Párizsban* nagyon óvatosak az üzlettel kapcsolatban.
 Paris-in very cautious-3PL DEF deal-with concerning

At best, this phenomenon would have been noted but hardly anything else would have

followed from the observation. Its magnitude, and deeper motivation, could not be plumbed by traditional methods of contrasting. As traditional horizontal contrastive studies are unidirectional, i.e. proceed from the material in one language to the other, we would have also probably failed to note that this construction is also attested in German and English. While it is possible, as shown by examples (11) and (12) respectively, it is relatively rarely made use of in these languages, if the capital is intended to be used metonymically:

- 11) South Korea's President Roh Moo-hyun's first meeting with George W. Bush, his US counterpart, in Washington on Wednesday was hailed *in Seoul* yesterday as a happy ending to a period of turmoil in relations between the military allies.
- (12) Nach mehr als zwanzig Jahren Krieg sei es äußerst
 after more than twenty years war is-SUBJ it extremely
 schwierig, einen Neuanfang zu finden, heißt es *in*
 difficult a new start to find said-is-3SG it in
Islamabad.
 Islamabad
 'It is said in Islamabad that after more than twenty years of war it is extremely difficult to make a new start'

Apparently these expressions do not count as referential metonymies in the classical sense of the definition. This means that we now have some more precise ideas about where some of the missing referential metonymies in Croatian and Hungarian may have gone. What is left for the contrastive analysis and cognitive linguistics is to tease out jointly the answer to the question of why this replacement pattern should exist. But before we turn to this issue let us bolster up our case by showing the systematic nature of such replacements.

	1	2	3	4
Capital	Metonymically used tokens	Locative PPs	Ratio 1:2	Percentage of 2 in 1+2
<i>Moskva</i>	57	5	11.4	8.77
<i>London</i>	24	4	6	14.28
<i>Sarajevo</i>	36	22	1.63	37.94
<i>Paris</i>	20	3	6.66	13.04
<i>Beograd</i>	90	27	3.33	23.07
<i>Berlin</i>	5	1	5	16.66
<i>Washington</i>	146	27	5.40	15.60
Total	378	89	4.24	19.05

Table 2: The ratio of metonymic uses of capital names and locative PPs in impersonal structures in the newspaper subcorpus of the Croatian National Corpus

We would like to claim that the pattern of replacement we noted above is not an isolated and quite incidental contrastive finding for which hardly any rational explanation can be offered.

For one thing, its systematic nature seems to be shown by its **relative** frequency in the newspaper subcorpus of the Croatian National Corpus. Consider the following counts for assorted capitals. The first column specifies the number of **instances** of straightforward metonymic uses, while the second specifies the number of PP replacements (most of the time with the preposition u 'in'). The third column shows the ratio of the two uses. The **last** column gives the percentage of these in the total of columns 1 and 2, under the assumption that these PP structures were also metonymies of some kind, a possibility we are going to consider below.

If we now consolidate our numbers arising from various counts and comparisons, and plot them against each other, we should expect to **have** a somewhat **clearer** picture concerning the question of where **all** the missing metonymies in Croatian and Hungarian **have** actually gone. The PP replacements account for a significant part of the deficit. There is roughly one such replacement for every four normal metonymies.

We now must turn to the why of this replacement pattern. We will argue that the observation about the replacement pattern of subjects is non-trivial **because** it is one of a number of strategies available to **solve** the problem of the preservation or maintenance of the topic-continuity in the flowing discourse in the case of metonymic subjects. This is in fact, in our **opinion**, the more natural option in Croatian and Hungarian, languages that (i) **have** prominent systems of impersonal constructions, and (ii) that belong to the pro-drop type of languages with rich agreement systems. The second option would be to avoid metonymy altogether, while the third, the least natural in the case of Croatian and Hungarian, would be to produce a whole string of repeatedly used metonymies. Finally, an unnatural solution would be to use anaphoric pronouns either according to the **gender/number** of the metonymic target or of the metonymic source. This is unnatural, or at least very marked, **because** it almost invariably leads to the breakdown in the continuity of the topic, as such pronouns in subject position are then very frequently interpreted as introducing new **referents/topics**.

One of the most important discourse-pragmatic functions of metonymy is to enhance cohesion and **coherence** of the utterance. It is something that is already at the very **heart** of metonymy as a conceptual operation whereby one conceptual content stands for another that both are activated. In other words, metonymy is an efficient means of saying two things for the **price** of one, i.e. two concepts are activated while **only** one is explicitly mentioned (cf. Radden and Kovecses 1999: 19). This necessarily enhances cohesion of the utterance **because** two **topical** concepts are referred to by means of one **label**, and there is consequently, at least **nominally**, less shifting or switching between topics.

While topics may persist for longer or shorter stretches, they eventually need to be maintained before they decay. It now **all** depends on how **easily** a language can maintain such double-barrelled metonymic topics. It appears that **English**, with its quite flexible system of co-referring pronouns (cf. the use of plural or singular pronouns in coreference with collective terms), but **relatively** rudimentary agreement system can achieve a **relative** longevity of such double-barrelled and ambiguous topics without incurring too much processing cost.

An attempt to use anaphoric pronouns in pro-drop languages like Croatian or Hungarian in order to maintain such metonymic topics —the most marked or unnatural solution of the four we mention above— would suggest a break in the topic continuity if the pronouns were to agree in number and person (and in Croatian in gender as well) with the metonymic target. Cf. the following illustration from Croatian, where *Washington* is masculine, while the metonymic target, *američka vlada* 'US government' would be feminine:

- (13) a. *Washington* se složio s prijedlogom, ali je još
 Washington REFL agreed with proposal but is still
 uvijek oprezan. ?On/*ona je spremadspremna na
 ever cautious he/ she is ready-3SG:?MASC/*FEM for
 sve.
 everything
 'Washington agreed to the proposal, but is still cautious. It is
 ready for everything'

The second sentence would be much better without the anaphoric pronoun and the predicative expression agreeing in person, number and gender with the subject of the previous sentence, if we want to keep the same topic:

- (13) b. Spreman je na sve.
 Ready-3SG:MASC COP-3SG for everything

Such chains cannot be indefinitely long, and the problem is not solved by extending the chain, it is just a sort of procrastination.

On the other hand, we note in the above examples that pro-drop languages like Croatian or Hungarian, even if they can do without any anaphoric pronouns, must very soon narrow down the *reference* of the topic in order to be able to select appropriate agreement features. Of course, one of the possible strategies is to avoid metonymy altogether, which accounts for a relatively high number of articles in the Croatian and Hungarian corpora that exhibit no metonymically used names of capitals.

Another unnatural solution to the pressure of maintaining topic continuity, attested both in Croatian and Hungarian texts in our corpus, is to stick to a whole series of metonymic uses of one and the same capital name within a single text. This is admittedly a very awkward solution (a strategy more appropriate for non-topics). Cf. now a sizeable part of an article from a Hungarian paper illustrating this point:

- (14) Vita *Phenjan* atombombája körül
 controversy Pyongyang nuclear bomb-POSS around [...]
 Tegnap aztán ugyanaz a rádió – onmagára
 yesterday however the-same DEF radio to-itself

hivatkozva - jól érthetően	azt	mondta,	hogy
citing well comprehensible-ADV	that	said	that
<i>Phenjannak</i>	joga van birtokolni	atomfegyvert,	
Pyongyang-DAT	right is possess-INF	nuclear weapons-ACC	
majd ugyanez a kijelentés megjelent a			
and the-same DEF	statement	appeared	DEF
phenjani	lapokban is.	Az Egyesült Államok	a
Pyongyang-ADJ	papers-in too	DEF United States	DEF
múlt héten	függesztette	fel	az Észak-Koreába
last week-in	suspended	PREF	DEF North Korea-to
irányuló	olajszállítást,	amely	az 1994-es
directed	oil-supplies-ACC	which	DEF 1994-ADJ
úgynevezett	keretegyezmény	értelmében	az
so-called	general-agreement	in-accordance-with	DEF
egyik	kompenzációs	tényezője	annak, hogy <i>Phenjan</i>
one-among	compensatory	measures	for-DAT that Pyongyang
leállította	régi típusú	atomeromuveit.	
closed	old type	nuclear-plants-POSS-ACC	
[...]			
Sok megfigyelő	korábban	núgy vélte,	hogy <i>Phenjan</i>
many observer	earlier	so thought	that Pyongyang
az egész	hírrrel,	miszerint	van
DEF whole	news-with	according-to-which	is
atomfegyverprogramja,		csak	az Egyesült
nuclear-weapons-programme-POSS		just	DEF United
Államokat	akarja	tárgyaló-asztalhoz	ültetni.
States-ACC	wants	conference-table-at	seat-CAUS-INF

'Yesterday, however, the very same radio station, quoting itself, said very clearly that Pyongyang has the right to possess nuclear weapons, after which the same statement appeared in Pyongyang papers. The United States suspended last week the oil supplies to North Korea which was introduced as one of the compensatory measures inducing Pyongyang to shut down its old-type nuclear plants. [...] Many observers were earlier of the opinion that the only goal that Pyongyang wanted to achieve by

announcing that it has a nuclear weapons programme was to bring the United States to the conference table'

When we consider these last two strategies, we see that they either lead to an utter absence of metonymies, or to the other extreme, viz. their **occasional** overuse. This means that metonymically used names of capitals are very unevenly distributed in the Croatian and Hungarian corpora, generally quite unlike in English and German.

The most natural strategy for languages such as Croatian and Hungarian, is to **remove** the pressure of maintaining the metonymic topic continuity by removing it from the subject position, and partly detopicalizing it at the same time, by having the name of the capital mentioned in a PP functioning as an adverbial, as illustrated above. This discourse-functional strategy is made possible, moreover, made the most natural one, by the typological givens of these languages. Their grammatical structure is pervasively characterized by the fact that they are pro-drop languages and that their productive subsystems of impersonal constructions play an extremely **important role**.

Both languages **have** numerous impersonal constructions. In addition to constructions with verbal and adjectival or nominal meteorological predicates, there are also constructions with experiencers in the **dative** or accusative (in Croatian), and in the **dative** (in Hungarian), and finite verb forms in the 3rd person singular:

- (15) a. Hladno/ toplo/ vruće/ loše/ dobro/ teško/ drago
 cold warm hot ill well hard glad
 mi je.
 me:DAT COP:3SG
 b. Boli me/ Strah me je
 hurt-3SG me:ACC fear me:ACC COP:3SG
- (16) a. (Nekem) tetszik ez a ház.
 me-DAT like-3SG this DEF house:NOM
 b. Melegem van
 hot-POSS: 1SG COP:3SG

While German exhibits comparable impersonal structures —often competing with personal ones— these are typically translated into English by means of personal constructions with predicative adjectives or verbal predicates, and Croatian and Hungarian obliques correspond to subjects in English.

There are further types of impersonal 'structures that are present in **all** the four languages under investigation, most notably those with impersonal verbs taking clausal complements (traditionally taken to be extraposed subjects). Moreover, there is a whole range of other impersonal constructions that can be productively formed in German, Croatian and Hungarian, many of them functioning as notional passives.

Another crucial difference between the four languages concerns the presence of an obligatory expletive or dummy subject in the matrix structure (obligatory in English and German but impossible in Croatian and Hungarian) as well as the productivity of these constructions with verbal predicates (far less productive in English). This is of course a natural consequence of Croatian and Hungarian being pro-drop languages, while English and German obligatorily require at least formal subjects across all types of constructions.

It is significant in our view that the same pattern of replacement of metonymically used names of capitals is found in some other pro-drop languages that have elaborate agreement systems as well as productive impersonal constructions. Cf. the following examples from Russian and Spanish:

- (17) *V Tbilisi že kategoričeski oprovergajut zavajlenija*
 in Tbilisi however categorical-ADV refute-3PL announcements
 o tom, Sto kakie-to diversionnyje
 about DET-PREP.CASE that some-NOM-PL diversant
 gruppy zasylajutsja v Abxaziju.
 group-NOM-PL being-sent in Abhazia-ACC
 'In Tbilisi, they categorically deny any reports that some sabotage
 detachments are being sent to Abkhazia'

- (18) *En Washington se consideraba seguro que*
 in Washington REFL considered certain that
 importantes dirigentes iraquies habian huido hacia el
 important leaders iraqi had fled towards DEF
 país vecino, ...
 country neighbouring

'It is taken for certain in Washington that important Iraqi leaders had fled to a neighbouring country'

Returning to the issue of how (non-)metonymic the adverbial replacements observed above are, we would like to argue that such prepositional and adjective phrases, so far overlooked in mostly English-biased research on metonymy (largely because this type of construction is as good as nonexistent in English in this function, as shown by our corpus), are also full-blown referential metonymies.

Rather than being literal locatives, we claim that these prepositional and adpositional phrases are two-tiered metonymies. In the first round of metonymic mapping there is a basic projection from a mental space that is opened by the particular discourse type and topic, i.e. a mental space is set up on the basis of our realization that the utterance in question is in terms of its text type a newspaper article dealing with politics, specifically with international relations. This mental space also contains elements of encyclopaedic knowledge that get projected too. These projections trigger the first layer of metonymic meaning. *Sarajevo*, *Washington*, and other

such names of capitals in our examples, are not used to refer to the locality as a whole – not just everywhere or anywhere in Sarajevo is meant **here**, etc. What is intended is not the whole domain but just a part or parts of it; specifically it is just the sphere of political life, more precisely its foreign affairs aspects.

If the context (and cotext) is different, i.e. in a different type of papers, or type of articles, the same place name can be used to refer to other aspects of political life, or to the press or media in general that are connected with this locality, its sporting scene, general public, etc. We claim that this first round of PART-FOR-WHOLE metonymic mapping takes place in both the straightforward examples of metonymies and the locative expressions alike. The differences between them appear in the second layer of metonymic meaning.

The context and the contents of the article then in the second step determine specifically the entity that the capital name refers to, i.e. whether the whole government, just a ministry, or some other institution, legal, economic, or otherwise, is actually meant. This is the stage at which we arrive in our examples at the specific low-level CAPITAL-FOR-GOVERNMENT metonymy.

In the case of bare capital name NPs we assume that a metaphorical mapping kicks in immediately after the second round of metonymic mapping and so to say cements the specific low-level metonymy. If a capital name stands for an institution which is a collective body, such as government, it is automatically personalized. This ORGANIZATIONS-ARE-HUMANS metaphor confers on the capital name a certain amount of agency properties, such as control and responsibility.

One might wonder why we claim that the metaphorical mapping in question is restricted to the second round of metonymic mapping, and does not take place before. Examples like *Washington made the wrong choice* may be cited as problematic for our claim, as they seem to suggest that the metonymic subject is already invested with some personalizing traits even if used in a poor context. There are in our opinion good reasons to assume that the specific personalizing metaphorical mapping we suggested is actually delayed until the second round of metonymic mappings.

First of all, a capital name used in a weakly metonymic sense in a relatively poor context lends itself to a whole range of interpretations, like any other place name. It could refer to a salient event taking place in the location specified, e.g. *Paris* or a prepositional phrase with this name, such as *after Paris* or *in Paris*, could be used to refer to the World Athletics Championships 2003. In a different context, *Paris* might be used to refer to the domain of fashion. A sentence such as *Paris was really appalling* will hardly be understood as referring to designers only. It will also include the reference to the fashions shows, clothes, etc. But it may also be used to refer to just clothes. This seems to indicate that metaphorical personalization does not take place at this stage.

Secondly, the ORGANIZATIONS-ARE-HUMANS metaphor we assume to be at work here can hardly apply to just any assembly of entities, even if they involve people. What seems to be necessary in our opinion for the metaphor to apply is that the entity in question should really

emerge as a clearly-defined one, i.e. as a genuine organization, with internal structure, more or less **clear** boundaries.

This of course **does** not preclude the possibility that other, less specific types of metaphors, **some** of which may include elements of personalization, may apply before the second round of metonymic mapping **in** certain contexts, i.e. **in some** types of situations allowing a vague reference to people such as, *the whole town*, etc.

We assume that the second layer of metonymic meaning is **formed** around locative expressions we are interested in **here** as well, but it is not followed by the specific metaphorical mapping mentioned above. It is probably blocked by the prepositional form of these expressions. This **also** means that they exhibit a much lower (if any) degree of agency, i.e. they are assigned less control and responsibility.

This means that there **is** a division of labour between bare NP metonymies and PP/AdP metonymies. The latter are a naturally suited answer to the functional pressure of providing means of relatively vague ways of **referring** to a highlighted subdomain of a matrix domain without investing it with control and responsibility. Note that the effect of the second round of metonymic mapping can always be **easily** cancelled, if need be, in the subsequent text. This PP structure allowing for **relative** vagueness is an additional strategy and compensates for the impossibility of more flexible on-line narrowing down of referents due to the default interpretation of **straightforward** metonymies in languages such as Hungarian or Croatian.

Summing up the results of our analysis, we could say that constraints on the cross-linguistic availability of certain types of referential metonymies seem to be the result of an intricate interplay of conceptual, grammatical and discourse-pragmatic **factors**. The marked differences observed initially **turn** out upon **closer** examination to be far less sharp contrasts, i.e. qualitative rather than purely quantitative as different languages, due to differences in their typological makeup, may use different metonymy types for certain discourse-pragmatic functions.

V. SOME THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL LESSONS FOR COGNITIVE AND CONTRASTIVE LINGUISTICS

It is **all very** well that by combining the strengths of cognitive and contrastive linguistics we were able to fill in so many pieces of the present puzzle. But there are **some** lessons that go beyond the purely descriptive **level**. There are **some** obvious gains for both, but **some instances** of adopting contrastive methodology in cognitive research may in fact produce **some** results that appear to be in a way embarrassing for cognitive linguistics. We would, however, **like** to **argue** that they are in fact a sort of blessing in disguise. Our theoretical point concerns above **all** the way that observed facts are motivated in cognitive linguistics.

Cognitively and functionally oriented linguists seem to **have** reached a broad consensus on the issue of motivation with respect to at least two of its aspects (cf. Lakoff 1987, Langacker 1987 and 1991, Haiman 1980,1983).

Firstly, motivation is a phenomenon exhibited by a range of linguistic structures that are neither wholly arbitrary nor fully predictable. Motivation is **also seen** as a matter of degree. Cf. Langacker (1987: 48) and Lakoff (1987: 346 and 493), who speak of levels of predictability and **relative** motivation leading to restricted predictions, respectively. Secondly, linguistic structures seem to be chiefly motivated by interplay of **external** factors such as cognitive structures and communicative needs.

However, cognitive linguists **have** always **been** aware that the whole **story** cannot be this simple, for at least two reasons. For one thing, cognitive structures and communicative factors need not work in unison. They are on occasion even likely to work in quite opposite directions. The expressive power of a language, defined informally as "the collection of concepts in that conceptual system that the language can distinctively express" (Lakoff 1987: 539) may be constrained to a degree by **some** requirements of communication. The **principle** of economy, at work in processes such as routinization and idiomatization of expressions, leads to simplicity, *i.e.* **minimal** differentiation of linguistic expressions. Languages can thus be regarded as "gigantic expression-compressing machines" (Langacker 1977: 106).

The fact that one set of these factors may gain primacy over the other in different languages in general **and/or** in specific linguistic structures, may help determine the shape of smaller or larger portions of the grammatical systems involved. The other element that complicates the picture is the **source** of cross-linguistic differences. Cognitive as well as functional linguists seem to **have** concentrated so far primarily on cross-linguistic similarities. If both cognitive structures and communicative needs are assumed to be universal and more or **less** shared by humans, *e.g.* metonymy and metaphor indeed seem to be universal phenomena, we should expect human languages to be, if not the **same**, then at least extremely similar. However, while **some** linguistic phenomena are ubiquitous, many others are specific to only **some** languages.

Obviously, the picture painted by the simple interplay of cognitive structures and communicative needs still lacks certain crucial details, **some** of which may be supplied by detailed cross-linguistic comparisons. The magnitude of cross-linguistic differences cannot be fully motivated just by **reference** to these two sets of **factors**. In the present paper, we show that whether and how a given language employs **some** cognitive processes in the formation of **some** linguistic structures in order to achieve specific communicative goals may **also have** to do with how other **areas** of the language in question are structured, *i.e.* with the shape of its **current** grammar (Mithun 1991: 160). This is **also** in line with Lakoff's (1987: 537f) characterization of motivation in terms of, among other things, global ecological location within a grammatical system. Our case study in the previous section is meant as another piece of **evidence** that the role of structural factors and their interplay with cognitive ones, **contrary** to the prevalent practice in cognitive linguistics, must not be downplayed.

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