@article{Gómez Alonso_2018, title={Virtue Perspectivism, Normativity, and the Unity of Knowledge}, url={https://revistas.um.es/daimon/article/view/328001}, DOI={10.6018/daimon/328001}, abstractNote={<p>It will be argued that personal agency, far from lacking epistemic value, contributes to knowledge in a substantial way. To this end, it will be claimed that what Sosa calls an <em>epistemic perspective</em> is necessary to solve the binding problem in epistemology at the three junctures at which it can occur: as the Pyrrhonian question of whether one can rationally endorse one’s epistemic rationality; as the problem of the epistemic status of guessing; and as the enquiry into the contribution of the agential perspective for evading coincidental luck. Our aim has been that of elucidating and expanding Sosa’s virtue perspectivism.</p>}, number={75}, journal={Daimon Revista Internacional de Filosofia}, author={Gómez Alonso, Modesto}, year={2018}, month={oct.} }