Lo que puede ser visto y lo que puede ser visto-en

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1. Lo que se pretende con este trabajo es mostrar la relevancia que los desarrollos contemporáneos en Psicología Cognitiva y la Filosofía de la Mente pueden tener para la cuestión de la representación visual, al hilo de la concepción de Wollheim. Dado que la propia teoría de la representación figurativa de Wollheim es explícitamente psicológica, y que, como él mismo afirma, el requisito mínimo de cualquier propuesta en este campo es ser compatible con una teoría general de la percepción, creo que merece la pena intentarlo.

La contribución se articula en dos partes: en la primera, se trata de reconstruir el problema que lleva a Wollheim a su noción de «seeing in», aportando justificaciones adicionales a su rechazo de la teoría de la semejanza y al «ojo inocente», de carácter empírico. En la segunda, se presenta la noción de «perspectiva de segunda persona», que he desarrollado para entender la interacción intencional cara a cara, como un modo distinto de interacción a la de primera persona y de tercera persona; se trata de ver hasta qué punto debe ser tenida en cuenta para delimitar lo que «puede ser visto en» el cuadro, con el objetivo de mostrar que el ámbito de la percepción visual abarca más de lo que deja entender Wollheim.

Lo que vincula estos dos aspectos, a mi modo de ver, es lo que podría entenderse como una crítica de la teoría de Wollheim. Donde él considera que la representación visual consiste en la «felicidad» o «éxito» (en el sentido de la pragmática de Austin) de que la experiencia fenoménica del «ver en» del espectador coincida con la intención del pintor, mi sugerencia es que esta experiencia visual está mediada por la atribución intencional al pintor (acertada o no). Cabe la posibilidad de que donde yo veo una diferencia, exista más bien un error de comprensión por mi parte. No obstante, afirma Wollheim: «No hay ninguna razón por la que el reconocimiento de la intención del artista tenga que jugar un papel en esta concatenación causal. La experiencia del espectador tiene que concurrir con la intención del artista, pero esto no tiene por qué hacerse mediante el conocimiento de la misma.» (*La pintura como arte, pp. 121-122*). Frente a este distanciamiento en la traducción a la representación pictórica del planteamiento de Grice del significado no natural, quizá para evitar una concepción comunicativa de la obra de arte, presento algunas investigaciones psicológicas que apuntan al papel de la atribución intencional en la comprensión del significado pictórico de las representaciones visuales.

2. El problema de la representación visual puede plantearse de modo simple en términos de la psicología de la percepción: a diferencia del mero ver, de la mera estimulación retiniana, la representación visual implica percepción significativa, que consiste en la activación de conceptos, en un «ver que tal y tal», una actitud proposicional. Dicho de un modo más filosófico, que la experiencia perceptiva está infradeterminada por los datos sensoriales. Ello exige entender la dimensión activa

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del sujeto, su aportación a la determinación del contenido de la experiencia, y por tanto, la falsedad del «mito del ojo inocente».

La teoría de la semejanza constituye el intento de orillar este papel constitutivo del sujeto de su propia experiencia, tratando de buscar un nivel de representación perceptiva previo e independiente de la espontaneidad (en el sentido kantiano) del sujeto. Ese es el nivel orrespondiente a lo «dado» en la experiencia, y que conduce a una metafísica de las apariencias, de eminente pasado filosófico. Aunque adopta diversas formas, converge en algunos conceptos clave: un cierto fenomenismo, la noción de campo visual como plano bidimensional, la posibilidad de una conciencia no conceptual de los contenidos de ese campo, etc. Es el núcleo que permite sustanciar la noción de semejanza entre representación visual y lo representado en términos de proyecciones semejantes en ese campo visual fenoménico Hay múltiples razones para rechazar la teoría de la semejanza, algunas aportadas por nuestro invitado. Quisiera aportar tres fenómenos de carácter empírico, porque no son, me parece, demasiado conocidos, y permiten introducir consideracions posteriormente relevantes:

a) el fenómeno de la regresión fenoménica al objeto real (Thouless, 1931).
b) los estudios sobre la capacidad de reconocimiento táctil de pinturas en relieve, y de producción gràfica de imágenes, por parte de ciegos congénitos (Kennedy, 1993).
c) el fenómeno de la «ceguera al cambio» (O'Regan & Noë, en preparación)

Aunque estos casos son complejos, convergen en rechazar el supuesto básico de la teoría de la semejanza, que construimos una imagen sensorial (esto es, fenoménica y en dos dimensiones) de lo que vemos, que constituiría la clave de la percepción de imágenes visuales. El primer caso muestra que la experiencia fenoménica no coincide con la estimulación retiniana; el segundo, que la percepción del espacio no depende solamente de la información sensorial visual, sino también háptica; el tercero, que no construimos una imagen mental interna fenómenica cuando percibimos.

3. A pesar de lo insostenible de la teoría de la semejanza no es fácil proponer una alternativa creíble. Creo que una exigencia que cualquier teoría candidata debería satisfacer es la de poder distinguir entre el modo en que una imagen de una calavera representa a los piratas o a la advertencia de peligro, del modo en que representa la calavera misma, en que es un dibujo o una pintura de una calavera. Está claro que las teorías simbólicas o lingüísticas no satisfacen esta exigencia, porque no reconocen la diferencia. Pero, al mismo tiempo, una teoría satisfactoria debería reconocer la continuidad entre imágenes y símbolos, en la medida en que las imágenes pueden convertirse en símbolos (el caso de la calavera); pero, más importante, porque este aspecto forma parte del mismo proceso de esquematización que constituye el núcleo de la llamada, en Psicología, «función simbólica»: la capacidad, que emerge alrededor del año y medio, de «tomar una cosa por otra» (en este punto es importante estar alerta ante la polisemia de «símbolo»: la contraposición de símbolo a imagen, o icono, proviene de Peirce; pero al hablar de «función simbólica» Piaget se refiere a todo tipo de signo).

La conclusión de este apartado es doble: a) que lo que puede ser «visto en» una pintura es lo que puede ser el contenido de la intención gráfica; b) que la comprensión de una pintura (como cualquier otro signo) implica la mediación de una atribución intencional sobre su sentido. Lo que está implicado en ver una pintura de x no es simplemente ver x en las marcas bidimensionales materiales que la constituyen, sino verlas como una pintura de x, como un artefacto, un producto humano producido con cierta intención. Evidencias: el papel del contexto y la intención del autor en la desambiguación de las imágenes; la posibilidad de representaciones visuales erróneas o ineptas; el papel del título en

guiar la percepción significativa. Importante: lo que se ve puede ser, en ocasiones, la única pista para captar la intención.

4. A mi modo de ver, el rango de lo que podemos ver en un cuadro abarca no sólo a aspectos visuales, sino a lo que puede pretender representar el autor (incluyendo, por ejemplo, relaciones causales). Es posible que para verlo necesitemos disponer de cierto conocimiento, o de la intervención de la imaginación esquematizadora, pero la percepción significativa puede ir más allá de los conceptos «visuales» (cuya relación con la modalidad visual es en alguna medida privilegiada).

En este sentido, he desarrollado lo que llamo «perspectiva de segunda persona» de la atribución intencional, que sería el modo en que interpretamos los estados mentales de los demás: como un tipo de percepción significativa, basada en la dimensión expresiva de tales estados (en la línea del segundo Wittgenstein). Es decir, que somos capaces de «ver» estados mentales, si bien el tipo de contenido que atribuimos por esta via no es proposicional.

¿Tiene esto alguna relevancia para el tema que nos ocupa? Me parece que sí. El caso más claro es el del cine, donde creo que es fácil mostrar que la comprensión de la secuencia de imágenes no depende ni de la empatía ni de la mediación teórica, sino de la puesta en marcha ilusoria de este mecanismo, de tal forma que nuestra experiencia consiste en reaccionar como si estuviéramos siendo partícipes de la situación representada.

En el caso del cine, ello se debe a que por regla general se representan historias de personajes. En el caso de la pintura, la perspectiva de segunda persona sólo se activaría en relación a escenas donde se representan acciones o interacciones humanas. Pero es lo que nos permite ver cómo se engaña a alguien, o ver la ignorancia de alguien.

On Seeing-in Problems

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Introduction

In this paper I shall address a number of criticism against twofoldness condition. By twofoldness, R. Wollheim refers to the fact that we can simultaneously attend to the marked surface and to the depicted subject on the canvas. This special fact renders to seeing-in experience its characteristic phenomenology and makes representational seeing different from current perceptual experiences or, as Wollheim puts it, straightforward perception. Wollheim offers in «Seeing-as, seeing-in, and pictorial representation»[1] some arguments for the distinction between seeing-in and seeing-as. He

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1   Wollheim, Richard. *Art and its Objects*. Cambridge University Press. 2nd edition, 1980.

also provides three further considerations which support the idea that twofoldness explains some particular phenomena concerning representational experience:

— Twofoldness can account for the distinctive phenomenology of representational seeing considered in terms of seeing-in.
— Twofoldness can explain some particular representational phenomena; i.e. the perceptual stability of the depicted subject despite the changes in the viewer's position.
— Finally, twofoldness can account for the way we appreciate and judge paintings' artistry. We can only explain our artistic appreciation by accepting the possibility of simultaneously attending to the marked surface and to the depicted subject. It is by relating the configurational aspect to the recognitional one that we appreciate how the medium renders its subject.

Now we will see some criticism against twofoldness and some responses to them.

1. Criticism to the twofoldness condition as the specific phenomenological feature to seeing-in or pictorial experience

1.1. Budd Criticism

In «On Looking at a Picture»[2], Malcolm Budd, claims that twofoldness condition is not necessary to explain the specific phenomenology of pictorial seeing, since it could be explained by other means. Moreover, Budd consider twofoldness as «undercharacterized». If twofoldness consists on two different aspects (the configurational and the recognitional), an account of how each aspect acquires content must be provided to avoid undercharacterization. In Budd view, this account must be a comparison between one of the aspects that shape twofoldness with the face to face experience. However, this comparison is not available in Wollheim's terms. Thus, Budd claims that the lack of comparison involves the incommensurability problem: pictorial experience is incommensurable with face to face experience.

My response to this criticism is that Budd requires a comparison which is not logically available, since each aspect has not, when considered separately, its own phenomenology.

1.2. Lopes and Levinson: Trompe-l'oeil and literal abstraction argument

Lopes[3] and Levinson[4] arguments question twofoldness as a necessary condition to explain representational seeing. Since there are some pictorial examples (trompe-l'oeil paintings and literal abstraction painting) which can be accounted for without making any use of twofoldness.

It seems that *trompe-l'oeil* and literal abstraction are the very limits of seeing-in, since they involve the evaporation of one of the aspects shaping the specific phenomenology of twofoldness.

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2   Budd. M.. en *Psychoanalysis, Mind and Art. Perspectives on Richard Wollheim*. Edited by Jim Hopkins & Anthony Savile. Blackwell. Oxford. 1992
3   Lopes. D.. *Understanding Pictures*. Oxford Philosophical Monographs. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1996.
4   Levinson. Jerrold. «Wollheim on Pictorial Representation». *The Journal of Aesthetics and art Criticism*. 56:3. Summer. 1998. pp. 227-233.

It must be added, in favour of Wollheim's point, that twofoldness boundaries are just the boundaries of representational painting. I think we can see this coincidence as a positive argument for the deep, intimate relationship between twofoldness and representational experience. The cases considered as challenging twofoldness condition are exactly the cases beyond which painting is not pictorial representation any more, and reaches a different status. What is visible in paintings finds its boundaries in the face-to-face experience: either we take for *real* the pictorial representation — as in *trompe-l'oeil* cases— or what we see is not a representation at all because what we see is *real*, and not something that stands for something else. Between both boundaries, beyond which painting stops being representational, we can place all those pictures where twofoldness is the phenomenological mark.

We can conclude that Lopes' and Levinson's arguments do not affect what Wollheim holds concerning twofoldness. Limiting cases illustrate what looking at a picture as an object and not as a pictorial representation means. In this sense, these cases fall out of the scope of a pictorial theory of representation; or, to put it less dramatically, these cases are just the depiction theory boundaries[5].

2. Seeing-in is not a sufficient condition to account for the representational experience

The following criticisms share their considering seeing-in insufficient to explain pictorial interpretation. And they consider it so because they also share another point: that a way to relate both seeing-in aspects —the configurational and the recognitional one— should be provided. So, unless we can provide a specific way to relate both aspects, the way in which the viewer reaches the visual content through a seeing-in experience remains obscure. In short, all the criticisms in this section ask for an element which makes explicit the way both aspects relate to each other.

My hypothesis, put bluntly, is that all those criticisms have not taken into account the role of the standard of correctness in Wollheim's theory. A standard of correctness is constitutive of representation. Therefore, the standard of correctness is what makes it possible for the viewer to see correctly what is depicted in the surface. Let us now to set up the general points that characterize the arguments of this section.

2.1. Budd incommensurability thesis:

— Any depiction theory should be congruent with a general principle: the viewer is able to recognize what is depicted in a painting, if she previously possesses the skill to recognize it as it would appear seen face-to-face. This involve that seeing pictorial representations must be commensurable with seeing face to face.
— So, it must be possible to compare our visual experience when looking at pictures with our visual experience when seeing face to face. If not, it is impossible to say why certain aspects of a visual representation depicts the painting content. This comparison should be carried out through a phenomenological comparison between one of the two aspects which shape twofoldness and the face-to-face experience.

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5   Someone would argue that to exclude these cases from the task of the theory is just to avoid the problem. However, I think that it simply recognizes these limit cases as pictures but not as visual representations. Some pictures may represent something, others will just be something.

Answer to 2.1.: We do not need to have seen the subject face to face to recognize it in a painting. Besides, Wollheim points out to the fact that we often learn about the look of objects by looking at pictures of them. This criticism is based on a misunderstanding of twofoldness aspects. Since each aspect has not its own phenomenology.

2.2. Schier criticism: the circularity argument

- — A third experience is needed to relate both aspects if we are to distinguish between seeing-in experiences and other kinds of visual experiences.
- — Circularity argument: the concept of depiction is subrepticially included in seeing-in definition.

Answer to 2.2.: this argument is derived from a misunderstanding of the seeing-in scope. Seeing-in is not coextensive to pictorial representation, but wider than it. Seeing-in explains more than pictorial experiences. It also explains how we see lambs in clouds or figures in wall stains, an these kinds of visual experiences are not cases of pictorial representation.

2.3. Walton's accommodation of seeing-in into his make-believe theory: The relationship between both aspects is ambiguous. Only through a explicitation of the relationship between them, can we give sense to twofoldness condition. Imagination can fill in the role required to relate both aspects.

Answer to 2.3.: There is no necessity of relating the two aspects to recognize what is depicted. So that the role Walton attributes to imagination is ill-founded.

2.4. Roelofs' hypothesis view: A conceptual hypothesis can relate the configurational and the recognitional aspects.

Answer to 2.4.: There are two possible interpretations of the «hypothesis view». According to Wollheim, both of the are flawed. The first, because the hypothesis role would be vacuous. The second, because it presupposes the perceptual experience to be wrong. Either the hypothesis view is vacuous, either it is wrong.

Final conclusion

All these criticisms are based in a misunderstanding of seeing-in structure as characterized by twofoldness. There is no term to relate both aspects of twofoldness. The only criterion of correctness which allows the viewer to see in the picture what is represented is the fulfilled artist's intentions.

Pictures and Their Surfaces: Wollheim on 'Twofoldness'

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The twofold thesis comes in two versions; the second developed to cope with criticisms of the first. In both versions Wollheim holds that when we say that we see the brush marks across the canvas, we are making a genuine perceptual claim. We are required by the twofold thesis to attend to the pictorial content at the same time. So when we say, for instance, that we see Marilyn Monroe in the picture, we are also making a genuine perceptual claim.

In the first version the descriptions of these two perceptual claims are characterised differently. As such, they are thought to be two experiences bound together in the peculiar perception of the painting. We have 'two projects' in mind when we look at paintings. We look at the paint surface and attend to its properties. We also see in the surface objects represented therein. The practice of painting has developed out of our ability to see surfaces representationally. So that now we see the surfaces of paintings as having been prepared for us in such a way that certain objects show up in the surface.

Malcolm Budd finds Wollheim's 'seeing-in' account wanting because at least one of the two experiences —one of the surface of the painting, the other of the depicted content— is left uncharacterised. In effect, the two experiences are to be
identified with their respective objects, (i) the patterned surface, and (ii) the depicted
scene. The second of these experiences, that of the depicted scene, is endured on the basis of the first experience, that of the coloured surface. This second experience is as of an absent content. How then are we to characterise it? It cannot be in terms of the face-to-face seeing of the depicted content or else it will fall into the illusionism Wollheim has been concerned to reject. So Wollheim's account is unable to provide an explanation of one of the two component experiences that twofold seeing, in its first characterisation, requires.

Wollheim's second view, as amended in Painting as an Art, now holds that there is but one experience which divides between two aspects. This single complex experience is now to account for the nature of seeing pictures. We have but a single experience in front of the picture, but this experience is an amalgam of the two aspects, neither of which can be identified independently of the other. That is, neither aspect —since it is a constitutive aspect of a single complex experience— can be regarded as commensurate with, respectively, an experience of the depicted scene or the experience provided by the face-to-face seeing of the patterned surface. (This is what the introduction of the double aspect view was meant to secure over the double experience view). Budd now argues this version inherits problems of its predecessor. For if, in the complex double aspect experience, we are unable to describe either of its aspects in isolation from the other, how then are we to identify the recognitional aspect? The price to be paid for gluing the two aspects together in a single indivisible experience is that we are no longer in a position to account for either aspect in

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terms of the experience of its face-to-face counterpart. We cannot describe the picture in terms of its depicted content since this is to ignore the surface as that aspect of the experience intrudes upon the complex experience under view.

Let us, then, turn to our conception of seeing and consider how that notion is to be used when reflecting upon the nature of looking at pictures. Seeing is a perceptual state. When asked to describe the processes involved in seeing, we would have to draw upon both human biology and physics. We would expect to ground our account in some causal story that knits together the behaviour of light and our sensitivity to it. Our seeing objects in the world, that is, is made available to us (at least in part) because external objects absorb and reflect light of different wavelengths. We are sensitive to these different wavelengths and our perceptual ability to see those external objects depends upon the activity of reflected light upon our optical apparatus. Seeing objects in the world is founded upon our capacity to discern their shape and colour. An account of the perceptual state of seeing, therefore, will set out to explain what mechanisms are ordinarily put to work by our nervous system and what standard external conditions must prevail for our optical apparatus to apprehend objects in our environment successfully.

In order to provide an account of our access to the world beyond we need some such externalist account of perception. At its weakest (and that is all that is required for present purposes) we shall say that features of our environment play some appropriate causal role in our perception of that environment. Successful episodes of perception, that is, require features of the environment to show up in those episodes and for those features to be causally responsible (in some appropriately specified way) for the perceptual episodes under consideration. Perception, that is, provides access to features of a subject's environment.

Suppose that a spectator sees a bundle of clothes and mistakenly represents what she sees as an old man. Seeing the man in the clothes pile is just a mistake. The subject's perceptual state, given by the kind of account put forward in normal circumstances, is such as to have led her to the false judgement that what she is seeing is an old man. Her experience was as of an old man but what she saw was a bundle of clothes. Closer inspection reveals that she had mistaken the bundle for a stranger. Correcting the original report will rely upon there being other evidence, either perceptual (looking closer) or non-perceptual (relying upon the reports of others or weighing up the evidence, which provides an alternative account for the experience undergone). Further observation or reflection thereby rules out the mistaken attribution. In the case of the mistake what the subject sees supports a variety of experiential content, none of which is inferred from the perceptual state, but each of which may be represented to the subject immediately. Further observation allows the subject to amend her experience in light of new evidence. Here the subject does not renounce what was first 'seen' at the level below content attribution.

In the case of seeing the rags and mistakenly identifying them with an old man the spectator is presented with perceptual content which might best be described in terms of volumes, sizes, colours, distances and lighting conditions. To the extent that the spectator will agree to these descriptions her perceptual content is veridical. Only when, on the basis of what she sees, she judges her perception to be of an old man does she move from veridical perception to non-veridical experience. Her experience is as of an old man; an old man is represented by her in her experience. Her seeing is a complex matter. In one sense what she sees is presented to her (her seeing is veridical) but in judging the object of her perception to be an old man she makes a mistake. There is something over there, and that something is what she sees; but she does not see an old man even though an old man is represented in her experience.

What might we learn from our mistakes? The phenomenology of mistaking the rags for the man is unlike that of 'seeing' the pictorial content in the picture in front of us. We do not mistake a picture of Marilyn Monroe for Miss Monroe. However, it would be hasty to leave the example there. For the possibility of mistaking a picture for its content, whilst at odds with the experience of looking at a picture, ought not to be ignored. It is this possibility that needs explanation if we are to do justice to the kind of experience engendered when looking at some, if not all, pictures.

We might now return to the bundle of rags. Suppose that the spectator, having corrected her mistaken experience, now recognises that these are the rags she had previously piled ready for collection. Can she not now re-create the visual part of her experience by attending to features of the rags and seeing them as an old man in the corner? It seems plausible that she can. But here she would have to mask out certain features that have now shown up in the corrected perception. Perhaps in attempting to mask out certain features, she has to give undue attention to other features in her perceptual state. So, here she fastens features of the willed experience as of the old man to parts of her perceptual field, whilst attempting to pay no heed to other features —particularly those features which provided evidence for the corrected veridical experience. The difference between her initial mistaken experience and this later contrived experience is that this latter is detached from any functional engagement with her environment. (It does not form the basis for a perceptual judgement.) It is known by the agent to be non-veridical and, further, it is not an illusion that the agent undergoes. Unlike the original mistaken experience, this newly contrived experience is imaginative. It is created by the spectator to fit the features of her perceived environment. In her mistaken perception, she had judged that a particular man was in the corner. Now she imagines a man in the corner. Which man? That one there in the corner with these features (the same features as 'the man' in her mistaken perception').

From the discussion thus far, however, we might now begin to consider some basic truths about the spectator's appreciation of the picture in front of her. Let us consider the spectator looking at a picture of a unicorn. She sees the picture surface in virtue of its being illuminated and in virtue of its variety of marks. On the basis of seeing the variously coloured surface she has an experience as of the unicorn in the picture. We are now in a position to note that her seeing the surface of the picture relies upon a straightforward perceptual account of light reflecting from the surface and exciting her nervous system by way of her optical apparatus. The unicorn, however, is not so illuminated. If the unicorn is lit dramatically from the right, say by a strong moon in an otherwise darkened sky, this will be contained in the report of what is experienced in the picture even if the subject is looking at the paint surface lit by a fluorescent light source from the left. That is, the illumination within the painting is independent of the illumination of the painted surface. The contents of pictures, that is, are not illuminated at all.

If what has been said thus far is plausible, then there are consequences for the aesthetics of the visual arts. In this conclusion I gesture toward them.

With what are we to replace 'seeing-in'? So far, it might seem, I have been advocating a return to 'seeing-as'; but I prefer the locution 'seeing-under', where what is seen, the coloured surface, falls under an imaginative description, itself in part constitutive of the experience endured. My preference here, for this terminology, is explained by the range of description available to us when speaking of pictures and their content. Moreover, if such a neutral view of pictorial comprehension can be given, then a supplementary account of pictorial purposes promises to provide the necessary distinctions to be made between our responses to pictures of different kinds. The proposal is that we regard pictorial seeing in terms of the perception of a physical object (the picture) together with the

wilful attribution of imaginative descriptions to that object. Hence the favoured terminology is 'seeing-under'. However, at times it may seem more natural to use 'seeing x in a', at others 'seeing a as x'. Provided that we remain aware that the primary object of perception is the picture and that the imaginative seeing of the pictorial content is given under a description, these two locutions should remain harmless enough.

Let us remind ourselves that in looking at pictures we enter into an imaginative relation with a physical object —the picture surface. Being imaginative, the experience undergone is subject to the will. Seeing the picture as thus and so is part of our project. Hence our experience can 'filter in' and 'filter out' features of the surface as they fit with our project. On occasion, when looking at the sports pages, I can look at a footballer in the execution of some contorted move without paying heed to the surface of the picture— without noticing that it is made up of tiny black dots on a creamy paper. My project, in looking at the photograph is to recapture a moment of last night's game. Features of the picture as an object do not enter into the descriptions that complete my project. The question of the transparency of pictures, it seems to me, arises not out of the logic of pictures, but rather out of the nature of our purposes in looking at them. (Since the nature of pictorial seeing, on my view, is wholly imaginative, it follows that we need to look at the nature of our imaginative practices to answer all sorts of questions that have usually found themselves asked in terms of the structure of pictures.)

Sometimes, the imaginative description of the perceived surface will mask out features of the surface and at other times it will not. The consumer of pictorial pornography has as his purpose sexual arousal and its eventual gratification. The imaginative experience he seeks contains no description of the pictorial surface but only of its content. To the extent that the perceived surface shows up in his experience, it is a hindrance to the fulfilment of his project. In this instance the nature of that project provides the basis upon which he directs his willed experience. He sees the picture and thinks of it thus. This thinking is a wilful form of seeing. It is experiential. By contrast the builder looking at the architect's plan of a kitchen layout is exercised by the requirement to place taps, drains and water pipes in places which are rationally determined. On looking at the plan he can see solid wall and cavity and can interpret according to features of the drawing that show up in his experience. That is, the experience the builder has is determined by him under a different mode from that which determines the consumer of pictorial pornography. The builder, that is, makes cross-references between drawing and kitchen and notes correspondences between the two. His drawing enables him to interpret features of the space in which he stands. These two examples show that there are different purposes with which we look at representations. In each case the purpose is pursued by imaginatively construing the picture surface under some description appropriate to the spectator's project.

Looking at paintings engages our understanding of the making of the picture as an art. Our pleasure in our appreciation of painting emerges from our seeing the surface of the painting as an object manufactured by an artist in such a way that we have experiences as of the content. We have the experience as of the content at one and the same time as we perceive the picture surface. That experience is fastened to the perception of the surface. Unlike the spectator's consumption of pictorial pornography, where the picture surface is masked out of experience, the picture surface of representational painting is the object of attention of the spectator. The experience is akin to a mental image which suffuses the perception of the picture surface. So I have but one perception; and upon the substratum of this perception an imaginative experience supervenes.

If what has been written here has plausibility, it follows that the enterprise of making pictures within the medium of paint exploits an aesthetic dimension in terms which will require more than mere content analysis. It will require an account of the collaborative enterprise the spectator has embarked upon. It is in this respect that we can come to see how the medium of painting offers both artist and spectator an imaginative arena in which aesthetic and social sensibilities are to be developed.

Expression in Arts and Nature: a contradiction in contemporary aesthetics?

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1. Richard Wollheim's Theory of Artistic Expression

R. Wollheim is one of the main specialists in Aesthetics pursuing the study of human reality. His reflections combining Philosophy of Art and Psychology offers some of the most subtle images regarding human aesthetic behaviour. It is therefore interesting to observe through his work if the aesthetic research that attempts to study the human being includes an incompatibility with the key points of environmental aesthetics. I intend to examine this point and come to an understanding of the way in which the two currents or legitimate objectives (which are, in my opinion, of maximum interest in contemporary aesthetics) may be reconcilable.

In his paper «Correspondence, Projective Properties and Expression» Wollheim repeatedly examines the subject in connection with its environment. Initially, the article presents the topical association of a natural space coupled with melancholy. The objective is to offer a new definition of the association between emotions and landscape as a forerunner to a new conception of artistic expression. For Wollheim the relationship between landscape and emotion is characterised by the correspondence between the characteristics of the external object and emotion. To identify these characteristics, Wollheim names them «projective properties», and considers that the qualities of an object are defined according to the human being projecting their emotions onto it. Wollheim summarise the general concept: «The idea briefly is this: When some part of nature is held to correspond to a psychological phenomenon, this is because it is perceptible as being of a piece with that state or as something on to which we might have or could have projected the state»[1]. This

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1   R. Wollheim, «Correspondence, Projective Properties, and Expression», in *The Mind and Its Depths*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge-Massachusetts/London, 1993, p. 154.

conception combines two most interesting perspectives. On the one hand a productive theoretical model to explain the diversity of expressions that an object or an environment can hold for a human being, based on a wide variety of psychological factors, and on the other hand, the fact that it is necessary to recognize certain qualities in the object that are not indifferent to the association itself.

Most interesting is the constructive human element (in psychological terms) in regards to an external reality which in turn relates to expressiveness. Again and possibly of greatest interest is the use of the phrase «projective properties» in the last pages of Wollheim's article. Here he proposes a most interesting argument: to apply the concept of «projective properties» to the arts. Wollheim asserts: «My central claim is that a work of art expresses an internal condition by corresponding to, or being of a piece, with it»[2]. Here we may consider two different conceptual developments: that the «projective properties» are the mechanisms that produce the potential expression in a work of art and that these «projective properties» correspond to an «internal condition» and therefore represent a psychological fact.

In order to define the psychological aspect of the creative process, it is necessary to further explore this concept. It is interesting to consider that applying the concepts of «internal condition» and of «projective properties» we may come closer to understanding what Wollheim pursued through his idea of expression in the artistic fact. The «internal condition» only emerges through the creative process, its contents depends on the steps followed by the artist during creation. The combination of the experiences that hold a role in the creation are not only those that the artist has outside of his work, but instead, the artist's experience as a whole, that which differentiates and forms the artist's psychological state. For this reason the work of art includes those experiences derived from the artistic creative activity.

Wollheim is also especially interested in pointing out that what the «projective properties» best express the «internal condition» implies an experience of the artist different from that of the spectator. He attempts to clearly distinguish the creative activity, a constructive process, from the spectator's aesthetic experience. That would mean the spectator of works of art always has an aesthetic experience that is less complex than that of the artist, and the intensity and depth of the spectator's aesthetic experience depends on its proximity to the reality of the artistic creation. According to Wollheim the conditions necessary to achieve an aesthetic experience, the knowledge of the artistic creation processes is necessary, including the component of rational understanding of those processes and the simultaneous emotional comprehension.

2. Expression and nature: a reality of contemporary art

Such conceptual evolutions leads to a definite line dividing artistic work and nature. As previously suspected, it seems that in order to understand the human being implies that it may not be compared to nature. It is even possible to believe that leading on from Wollheim we are placing ourselves in the antipodes of the aesthetic environmentalist's proposal that it tries to put man and nature on the same plane. There are different ways to research on the nature of this problematic confrontation. One of great interest is that of checking that if with the application of Wollheim's terminology to art it may be possible to understand the union of nature and artistic creation and even

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2   Ibid., p. 155.

a harmonious fusion of both. I will propose a approach to confronting Wollheim's concepts to a reality of contemporary art. The work is a thermal complex that finds itself in the middle of a natural environment in Waltz, built at the beginning of the nineties by Peter Zumthor.

Considering Wollheim's expression concept, which implies that art always expresses a psychological fact, a question immediately arises: Can nature be the main element of expression, without converting its «projective properties» to becoming mere means of transport of a psychological phenomenon that eclipses nature? Could the perceptive element that provides us with the evidence of nature develop a fundamental role in the artistic process while maintaining its identity intact?

In a contemporary text to the Valls Thermen, Zumthor refers to natural elements as entities that possess an intimate value in his own experience of artistic creation: «The confrontation with the characteristics of concrete entities such as the mountain, the stone, the water, in the peak of a precise constructive task, implies the possibility of capturing, of extracting a part of the original essence, unviolated by civilization, of these elements, and of creating an architecture that is born of and returns to these elements»[3]. These words are confirmed by the artistic practice followed by Zumthor, where an artistic experience of nature demands the presence of nature, concretely of the main natural elements characterising the environment of the thermal baths: the rocks of the mountain, the water of the thermal sources and the light of the sun. This premise implies a very interesting point of view for our inquiry. Can the original experience of nature be a part of the «internal conditions» expressed by the work of Zumthor, or even its main character?

An «internal condition» being the experience of an original sense of nature could signify that the artist's task would be to look for the correspondence of those «projective properties» with nature, i.e. looking for the way in which nature expresses nature. But how is the artist able to give a presence to the expression of nature in his creation? Or rather, can this question explain Wollheim's theory of expression to us?

In response it is necessary to consider two different types of «projective properties»: those that depend on the artist's work and those that do not, i.e., those that are natural. In order to distinguish those natural «projective properties» we could mention to permanence of their perceptive qualities: the original base of perception, of the stone, of the water and of the air, are one in the experience of the nature of Zumthor as in that of the spectators. Therefore we could consider that a fundamental part of the artistic work the main condition for the efficacy of this kind of projective properties would be the spontaneity of the perception. On analysing the second kind of those «projective properties», that in our case are born of the artistic work of Zumthor, we should consider the fact that the experience of nature depends not only on the perceptual power of materials, but also, in this case, of the arrangement, location and combination of these in the artistic creation of a space. These «projective properties» define in quality and quantity the main perceptions in the experience of the artistic work implying different aspects to the single perception. We can say in that case the expression of nature will be the result of the process of actions on nature during the creation.

The use of Professor Wollheim's terminology involves investigating the difference between a simple experience of nature and one that is artistic and in which nature can play a main role. Consequently, after this conceptual introduction we have the elements to analyse how art and nature combine, observing how the second category of «projective properties» influences the first

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3   Cfr., Peter Zumthor. „Il nocciolo duro della bellezza» (1991), en *Pensare Architettura*, Lars Müller Publishers, Zurich 1997, p. 29.

category. This analysis can als be interesting because we may discover if in Zumthor's work the actions on nature reinforce the possibility of that experience of the original nature.

Zumthor builds the thermal baths like a complex of stays using the straight line as the basic geometric element for the composition, the spaces for each one of the places used for the different possibilities of the thermal bathrooms are always defined by straight walls and rectangular plants. There is a very clear structural element in the process of composition of space. To examine the meaning of that geometric structural basis requires observing the material creation of those spaces. A first image of the spaces allows us to distinguish that the structural simplicity is an element confirmed by the simplicity of a vacuum, the spaces are not broken up by any architectural element. The most important characteristic is, however, the uniformity of everything, the walls are always made entirely of the same material, one is surrounded by materials of a simple structure and it is not possible to find elements that distract of the experience of the spaces. What are the constitutive elements of that experience?

The first is the stone, all the vertical surfaces that make the structure visible and configure a space are composed of stone. All interior surfaces of the interior and external walls of the building are made from gneiss, the characteristic stone of the mountains surrounding the thermal baths. The walls of stone are a product of a very long handmade elaboration, they are formed of stone plaques, 5 centimetres thick, inserted one on the other using a method that reminds one of that used by the Inca, although in this case the plaques are horizontal and regular. One does not perceive any element of union, such as cement, in the surface of the walls and that this surface is not perfectly flat, but rather it presents the small irregularities that have taken place with the cut of each plaque. The result of this method is a uniform and inequal surface which involves both visual and tactile perception, walls which are made of the one material but whose texture never repeats itself.

None of the spaces we experience there can be found in that arrangement in nature. We have also presented two «projective properties» and we will be able to explain the role of those «projective properties» in the constructive process as elements that create the «internal condition» expressed by the thermal baths. But if we say that the «internal condition» consists of expressing an experience of nature from its origin we cannot now maintain the possibility of a purely creative constructive process that does not involve nature because, as we have seen before, the presence of nature is already implied in Zumthor's work. Nor can we explain the creative process as a method that leaves nature intact as both require to be considered at the same time as configuring factors of an aesthetic experience.

Perhaps therefore the key lies in considering the order of the constructive processes. Let us say that in the thermal baths the starting point is the surrounding nature, a construction with the spirit of expressing it. The creation of the building has performed this spirit and reaches an aesthetic fullness with the mineral element in the constitution of the spaces. A geometric simplicity in front of us with the purity of straight lines, plane surfaces, proportionate regularities, geometrics that inspire us to judge architectural beauty comparable to that of other great works. There is another important characteristic derived mainly from the authenticity of the construction of its the handmade character. The building is characterised by a coherence between the structure and the appearance, the mineral masses are never only a surface, but rather they constitute the construction. But the result of that conception is also a peculiar configuration of the experience of the material that one sees inside the thermal baths, it gives the impression of being inside a group of stone blocks emerging from the heart of the mountain. The stone masses are blocks of a subtle mineral substance with the ability to express nature in its unknown and far origins before history.

Inside and outside there are planes of water cutting the stone cleanly and covering it with geometric transparencies that vary according to the different colours of the water, born of the different natural sources. They are the different pools that cut sharp geometric forms in the rock in the interior as much as on the exterior of the building. There is also a very important communication dynamics between exterior and interior thanks to the light. The same natural light illuminates most of the interior spaces, often being projected to trace straight lines, the light can cut the atmosphere with the pale color of the mountain clouds, brilliant sunny yellow, pale blue or afternoon red. All these colors are absorbed in different ways by the rock walls thanks to the handmade work that transforms the stone into an extraordinary screen. It is also important to observe that in the deepest spaces of the thermal baths there is minimal light, as if it were the dimness of the interior of the mountain, and that light increases as it ascends to the higher spaces. A trip trough the different spaces becomes an trip through the relationship between light and the mountain. Nature shows its silent shades and makes that a space can live with it when allowed to be a part of its rhythms. The formal construction of the building becomes an entrance to its environment. The main constructive components connect the geometric mineral interior with the exterior, with that presence of light and water, and the result is that of the three fundamental elements in mountainous environment of Switzerland. It would be unlikely that the aesthetic experience does not include, as evidence, the conscience of living something natural.

I think Zumthor outlines an «internal condition» clearly associated with an emotional experience that can involve different types of emotional pleasure. First, there is a component of aesthetic pleasure in the vision of the work, where it is possible to appreciate the union of creative formal aspects with a strong innovation sense with the experience of their rich material and aesthetic quality that develop their strength in a sensual experience of perception.

In second place the experience of bathing is conceived as a experience of proximity with nature. Zumthor creates an environment conscious of the planned use of the building, a use where the value of perception will be wide —it implies a direct corporal contact with the building, the nudity makes the relationship with the environment more intense and the different thermal activities increases the tactile and smell, more so than in any other building. That proximity goes together with pleasure, pleasure not only of the relaxing, but of the contact with something more and more elusive.

This example of architecture has united all the natural elements which were at its point of departure, creating through them the space for an aesthetic experience: the way in which Zumthor proposes the experience of original nature. This interpretation, achieved through the use of Richard Wollheim's concepts, is proof of how the terminology need not be limited, and may in fact be a possible way of accurately describing how arts can involve nature and how nature reaches a singular place in our experience thanks to a complete aesthetic experience.

The 'Artist's Theory' and its Theoretical Potential

KATERINA REED-TSOCHA*

In this paper, I discuss the broader theoretical and methodological potential of an important, and relatively neglected, idea which was introduced by Richard Wollheim. The artist's theory is the artist's conception of his/her art. Wollheim urges us to regard art primarily in terms of an intentional activity. In 'The Work of Art as Object'[1], he explains that the concepts which are operative in art-making form a hierarchical structure as more determinate concepts fall under the more general ones, and argues that this conceptual hierarchy, which regulates the production of works of art, provides us with a theory of art. Moreover, these concepts may be experienced differently at different times and hence parts of them that remained implicit may become explicit or even dominant. According to this account, the Greenbergian thesis that modernist works «declare their surfaces» can be reformulated along the lines of a conceptual reorganisation that brought the physicality of works of art (that is, their possession of a surface) to the foreground. The concept of physicality, a peripheral characteristic in art before 1905 has been experienced differently since. In 'Are the Criteria of Identity that Hold for the Different Arts Aesthetically Relevant?'[2], Wollheim argues that «the artist's theory, under which every artist works contains a concept of the kind of work he is engaged in producing and this concept will necessarily include reference to the category to which the work belongs, i.e. to the criteria of identity that hold for it»[3]. Criteria of identity can be subsumed under the broader heading of the work's 'history of production', and Wollheim argues, contra Goodman, that the history of production is relevant across the arts. The argument that criteria of identity are aesthetically relevant relies on the thesis that the adequacy of aesthetic theory should be assessed on the basis of whether it is able, where appropriate, to reconstruct the artist's theory.

I propose a strong reading of the artist's theory according to which the theory determines the criteria of identity and principles of individuation that apply to works of art, i.e. their singular or multiple status. This would imply that the ontological distinction between singular and multiple arts is not as fixed as we may think. It is interesting to examine the methods employed by a traditional singular art, such as painting, in order to realise the democratic ideal of multiplicity which would enable «more» art to reach larger audiences. This leads to two observations: first, that, as Wollheim argued in his discussion of Vasarely, the revised principles establish new thresholds of aesthetic discrimination, and second, that although this is the case, in practice the techniques of multiplication were reproductive techniques, often borrowed from the graphic arts. Accordingly, we must decide ad hoc whether the works may or may not belong to the category 'painting'. Warhol's silkscreened

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1   Wollheim, R. 'The Work of Art as Object' in *The Mind and its Depths*. London and Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
     University Press, 1974.
2   Wollheim, R. 'Are the Criteria of Identity that Hold for a Work of Art in the Different Arts Aesthetically Relevant?' *Ratio*
     20 (1978) 29-48; Essay II. *Art and its Objects*. second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
3   In *Ratio*. op.cit., p. 36.

canvases present a case to consider. In all cases, the theoretical importance of invoking the artist's theory lies in the way in which it anchors an area as abstract and artificial as ontology in artistic practice.

The artist's theory provides a response to what has proven to be a very seductive way of thinking. A locus classicus is Strawson's argument[4] that the attribution of ontological singularity to painting relies on the «merely contingent» fact that we lack the technology to achieve perfect copies. The argument involves an appeal to 'pure logic' and attempts to establish that all works of art without exception belong to a unitary ontological category, that of types. Recently, this basic argument has made a comeback in the context of a sophisticated ontological theory of works of art as action-types which was proposed by Gregory Currie[5]. Following this debate, I argue against unitary ontologies, in particular the ones that subsume all works under a blanket attribution of plurality, and in favour of traditional schemes that maintain the distinction between singular and multiple arts, allowing, however, for the fluidity of ontological categories. The idea is to block the first step of such arguments, which relies on the logical possibility of the perfect replication of paintings, as unintelligible. Rather, the work's singular or multiple status should be determined at the level of production.

Further issues arise with respect to the status of the artist's theory. Taking into account the heuristic value of different, often incompatible, interpretations of the artist's objectives, I propose to attribute the artist's theory to an artist construct rather than making its validity conditional upon retrieving the intentions of the actual artist. As such, it encompasses hypothetical, rather than actual, intentions. In the final paper of the paper, I consider possible objections to this reformulation in terms of a theory attributable to a «postulated artist».

My conclusion is that the artist's theory is an invaluable methodological tool which leads to a very substantial enrichment of our conceptual resources in exploring the ontology of works of art. Contrary to the objection that ontological theories, such as the one that Wollheim develops, have no bearing on «cultural significance»[6], the proposed strong reading of the artist's theory leads to a refocusing of our attention to a number of complex issues arising in artistic practice, which are obliterated by the blanket attribution of indiscriminate multiplicity. The artist's theory makes it possible to argue that the multiplicity of artworks is given by a number of parameters, which include both artistic techniques as well as the theoretical renderings of these techniques, thus placing traditional ontology within a broader context of cultural and historical investigation. This line of thinking, which points in the direction of a mode of enquiry that Lydia Goehr has called 'historical ontology' or 'cultural metaphysics'[7], deviates radically from Wollheim's own approach. Given the conclusion derived from what I called above a strong reading, it may be objected that the idea of the artist's theory is put to a use unwarranted by its initial formulation. However, it may be preferable to regard it as reflecting the fertility and the flexibility of the original idea.

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4   Strawson. P. 'Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art' in *Freedom and Resentment*. London: Routledge, 1974.

5   Currie. G. *An Ontology of Art*. London: Macmilan, 1989.

6   Cf. J. Margolis, 'Ontology of Art» Historical Ontology' in M. Kelly (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics*. New York: Oxford University Press, vol. 3, p. 391.

7   See *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

Reconstruir lo incierto, o revisitando Manet con
Richard Wollheim

JORDI IBÁÑEZ*

Mi trabajo comenzaba con una suerte de confidencia metodológica que Wollheim nos hace en el Prólogo a *La pintura como arte*[1]. Al enfrentarse a obras ya conocidas o que veía por primera vez, Wollheim nos cuenta que desarrolló una manera de mirar los cuadros que exigía derrochar mucho tiempo pero que se revelaba particularmente fecunda. Así pues (nos dice), «acabé percatándome de que a menudo era necesario pasar aproximadamente una hora delante de un cuadro para que tomaran cuerpo asociaciones peregrinas o percepciones erróneas, aunque motivadas, y sólo entonces, tras pasar otra hora o más delante de él, podía esperarse que revelara su verdadero ser». (PA, 13) Esta pequeña confesión tiene unas implicaciones bastante complejas que intenté desarrollar en mi ponencia.

Para ello no quizá esté de más recordar que algunas de las ideas características de la actitud interpretativa de Wollheim frente a las imágenes tienen una innegable dimensión temporal. La idea de la crítica como un proceso de reconstrucción (*retrieval*) de intenciones del artista[2], la tesis del escrutinio (*scrutiny thesis*)[3], o la misma noción de ver-en (*seeing-in*)[4], creo que son impensables si no las asumimos como la expresión de un proceso que, por lo menos, corre paralelo o deshace (y en cierto modo rehace) el proceso mismo de la creación, del que el cuadro, en su estado final, no deja de ser una especie de corte.

Naturalmente, no son sólo las propuestas teóricas de Wollheim las que conllevan un elemento temporal implícito en el proceso de la comprensión de imágenes, aunque sí creo que puede afirmarse que, con su actitud teórica, el papel que desempeña el vector tiempo en la secuencia del ver y el comprender adquiere un sentido que no es ni accidental ni obvio, y, por lo tanto, se convierte en relevante y significativo. Su idea de la duplicidad (*twofoldness*) es sabido que entra en debate con otros planteamientos opuestos, particularmente con la tesis del ilusionismo de Gombrich. La duplicidad supone un proceso de ida y vuelta en la comprensión y el reconocimiento de imágenes, de tal modo que se ve *en* la superficie y ciertamente se ven formas *en* esta superficie, pero no se deja nunca de percibir la superficie como tal, de modo que, al no desaparecer ésta, tampoco se produce la fusión instantánea entre la representación y la idea del objeto representado, que es lo que da pie a lo ilusorio. En el modelo teórico de Gombrich, el tiempo de la mirada busca fundirse en el resultado de la

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1   Richard Wollheim, *La pintura como arte* (1984), tr. de Bernardo Moreno Carrillo, Visor, Madrid, 1997 (= PA).
2   Richard Wollheim, «Criticism as Retrieval», en: *Art and Its Objects*, Cambridge University Press, 1980 (1 1968). También el primer capítulo de PA. (Lo que hace el artista).
3   Richard Wollheim, «Art, Interpretation, and Perception», en *The Mind and Its Depths*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (US) & London, 1993.
4   Richard Wollheim, «Seeing-as, seeing-in, and pictorial representation», in *The Mind and Its Depths*. También el segundo capítulo de PA. (Lo que ve el espectador(y p. 426, nota 5).

ilusión, que triunfa en la instantaneidad de la creencia. Pero en el modelo wollheimiano del ver-en y la duplicidad, a pesar de que en un principio el mismo Wollheim pensara en «dos experiencias distintas que se dan simultáneamente» (PA, 427, n. 6) (y la simultaneidad vendría a darse como una recaída en lo ilusorio», lo relevante pasa a ser el desdoblamiento de una misma experiencia en dos aspectos distinguibles aunque inseparables (por ejemplo: ver la ilusión como intención y su soporte como convención material o técnica). Este desdoblamiento no sólo entre el espacio (físico) de lo representado y el espacio (mental) de la representación, sino también en los «tiempos» respectivos de cada espacio, convierte la experiencia misma del mirar en una experiencia discriminativa y atenta a su propia naturaleza, desvinculada del ilusionismo historicista.

La distinción entre la temporalidad propia de acciones con sentido (o que buscan tener sentido) y la historización de lo temporal también está explicitada en las ideas de Wollheim sobre la tarea de la crítica y la comprensión de las imágenes en algún pasaje clave. En su ensayo «Art, Interpretation, and Perception», en *The Mind and Its Depths*, establece una distinción entre dos estrategias interpretativas básicas, la de la recuperación de un sentido (*retrieval*) y la de la revisión (*revision*) de las condiciones para que un sentido se produzca. La primera estrategia se orienta hacia la búsqueda de las normas o convenciones que hacen que una obra funcione de un modo y no de otro. La segunda investiga cuáles son nuestras normas y convenciones que nos hacen accesible, en un aquí y ahora determinados, el funcionamiento de una obra. Sobre esta distinción, Wollheim observa lo siguiente: «Donde el significado se piensa como algo que debe ser descubierto, el objetivo de la crítica se orienta hacia una tarea de recuperación; donde el significado es algo que debe ser construido e impuesto y (presumiblemente) renovado de generación en generación, la crítica se orienta hacia la revisión. Mis propios instintos van en el sentido de la recuperación, aunque la consideración crucial que puedo alegar es que la tarea de la recuperación, a diferencia de la revisión, da una respuesta al hecho central del arte: que éste es una manifestación intencional de la mente»[5].

Por lo demás, es cierto que Wollheim se ha referido a menudo, en *La pintura como arte*, a la cuestión del tiempo en la misma pintura. No sólo, ciertamente, en el pasaje del prólogo al que ya me he referido al principio. Así, por ejemplo, en *La pintura como arte* nos comenta la afición de Proust de ir al Louvre para buscar en los cuadros de los antiguos maestros a figuras parecidas a sus amigos, con lo que «por el placer del momento» se desestimaba la intención del artista (PA, 65). A propósito del mismo Proust, y de su ensayo sobre Chardin, también menciona el hecho de que la gran cuestión del placer por la pintura «acabe con una frase sin completar», al igual que sucede en el *Praeterita* de Ruskin (PA, 126). Puede decirse que son menciones marginales. Y seguramente son difíciles de asimilar a los presupuestos teóricos del *retrieval*, pero no por ello dejan de aludir a cuestiones de importancia. También, refiriéndose al estudio de Riegl sobre el retrato de grupo holandés, Wollheim nos recuerda que la narración es el «recurso obvio para soldar distintas figuras en un mismo espacio» (PA, 195). O más adelante, cuando establece una brillante asociación entre el rostro del Rinaldo dormido de Poussin o la bacante dormida de Courbet, nos habla del «vagabundeo de los pensamientos por la tradición» de la pintura europea (PA, 215), y confiesa «haberse aprendido» de memoria el *Rinaldo y Armida* de Poussin. Por último: los comentarios dedicados a las diversas versiones de la historia de Antíoco y Estratónice de Ingres no pueden hacer menos que girar en torno a la tensión que supone la elipsis que la imagen inflige en el relato (PA, 285 y ss.).

Bien: todo esto planteaba un marco teórico que a continuación se sometía a examen mediante la hipótesis que el mismo Wollheim desarrolla en PA sobre «el espectador en el cuadro» para com-

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5   *The Mind and Its Dephts*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (US) & London, p. 134.

prender ciertos rasgos del arte de Manet. Mi lectura buscaba rescatar los elementos de modernismo (de autoconciencia crítica del material artístico y de la práctica creativa y crítica) que podían quedar disueltos o neutralizados en la lectura, por lo demás muy bien argumentada, que Wollheim propone de Manet en PA.

El paso final consistía en recuperar, a partir de un salto analógico en absoluto extraño al mismo Wollheim, un concepto de temporalidad psíquica (a partir de Freud y Lacan) como posible contra-argumento que hiciera posible tanto entender el modelo temporal indispensable para la elaboración del sentido incluso en aquel tipo de obras «atemporales» (como la pintura), como entender cuál era la actividad propia (relevante según una concepción modernista de la pintura de Manet) del «espec-tador en el cuadro» propuesto por Wollheim como clave de acceso a los enigmas del arte de Manet. La conclusión era que el modelo de temporalidad psíquica utilizado por el psicoanálisis (y ratificado por la neuropsicología) permitía entender que este «espectador en el cuadro» no se desplazaba en el espacio imposible de la pintura, pero sí en el tiempo indispensable de la comprensión del cuadro, aunque fuera únicamente al nivel del desplazamiento del ojo sobre la superficie del lienzo.

In & Out: The Dynamics of Imagination in Narrative Participation

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Contemporary philosophical theories on narrative participation (i.e., emotional engagement with the fictional events of a narrative) and character participation (i.e., emotional engagement with a narrative's characters) can be divided into two general competing views. The *participant view* holds that we participate in the fictional events of a narrative so to speak «from within» and that we identify with the narrative's positive protagonists, or at least empathize with them. Hence, the participant view in its various forms argues for the centrality of self-oriented emotional responses, such as those of empathy, to the processes of participation in narratives. In contrast, theories belonging to what can be called the *onlooker view* claim that our responses to characters are for the most part other-oriented, i.e., of the sort of sympathetic responses. As readers or viewers or listeners of a narrative, we surely respond to the narrated events but «from without» as observers of situations we understand and assess third-personally.

Methodologically, the competing accounts of narrative and character participation must be assessed in light of the analyses of real life mechanisms of emotional participation in events

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affecting others and, most importantly, affecting ourselves, in the past or the future, by memories and anticipations. Such a methodological proposal is very much in the spirit of the work of Richard Wollheim, on the imagination and its relevance to the areas of aesthetics and personal identity (see especially his *On Art and the Mind* and his *The Thread of Life*).

The participant view defended

Noël Carroll, the most outspoken defender of the onlooker view, has raised a variety of objections to the participant view, both to the theory emphasizing the notion of identification with characters and to the one claiming that we empathize with characters (see his *The Philosophy of Horror* and his *A Philosophy of Mass Art*). His objections to identificationism, however, are easily shown to be targeting more of a straw man than a real competitor to the onlooker view. Carroll in fact conceives of identification as some sort of mental fusion, one that would bring, if occurring, readers, viewers, or listeners of narratives to think they *are* the characters or have *the same* mental states *as* theirs. However, identification involves the imagination and hence no illusion or identity. When I identify with the young teenager who received his first romantic kiss at a high school party, for instance, I am not under the illusion of being presently kissed; nor am I in the same emotional state I was in back then.

Carroll's objections to an empathy-based theory fail in a similar manner. That is, they can be shown to be ill grounded once assessed in light of more mundane instances of emotional engagement with others or with ourselves. Carroll claims, first, that most often empathy is unneeded because omniscient narrators or the characters themselves tell us what the characters' emotional states are. Second, he claims that the object of our sympathetic responses is different from the object of the self-oriented emotional states of the characters. Yet, Carroll's objections betray two assumptions that prove to be wrong vis-à-vis the role and place of empathy in our emotional engagement with ourselves or others. Empathy is not merely a tool to know what a person's emotional states are —in memories and anticipations, for instance, empathy is a tool to know what certain past or present emotional states are *like*. Moreover, that we sympathize with someone, whether real or fictional, by no means entails that we do not empathize with her as well, and have emotional states possessing, in some sense, the same object as the emotional states of the person we are empathizing with. Though we can certainly be concerned for people with whom we do not empathize, and in that sense sympathize with them, the most central instances of sympathy require, in addition to such concern, an empathic representation of what the other's mental states are like. At the very least, the presence of a sympathetic response does not exclude that we are empathically engaged as well.

In sum, the participant view promises to have more explanatory power than the onlooker view, thanks to the pervasiveness of empathy in our emotional engagement with others, including the characters we find in narratives.

Richard Wollheim: Central vs. Acentral Imagining, Iconic vs. Non-Iconic Mental States

A better understanding of empathy is achieved largely through a better understanding of the sort of imagination empathy requires. In the literature, empathy has been rightly connected to what Wollheim has called «central imagining» as contrasted to «acentral imagining» And this distinction has been related to the divide between the participant and the onlooker view. However, philosophers

like Carroll (*A Philosophy of Mass Art*) and Murray Smith (*Engaging Characters*) have misconstrued the central/acentral distinction, failing to relate it to another distinction proposed by Wollheim, that between «iconic» and «non-iconic» mental states.

When centrally imagining an event, we imagine it, according to Wollheim, «from the inside,» i.e., from the point of view of the person, or *dramatis persona*,» whose experience we are imagining. In contrast, acentral imagining is not occurring from the inside of any character of our «imaginative project.» What the current philosophical debate has failed to acknowledge is that the central/acentral imagining distinction is, at Wollheim's lights, internal to what he has called iconic mental states —states having the characteristic, among other things, of representing an event to ourselves. Iconic mental states are found not only in acts of iconic imagination but in event-memories, dreams, and fantasies as well, and should be contrasted to the non-iconic mental states that are typical, e.g., of mathematical calculations. Both Carroll and Smith have contrasted central imagining to entertaining an «idea» or «thought» in mind. However, this notion fits the description of a *non*-iconic mental state, not that of an instance of acentral imagining, which is instead iconic. Accordingly, Carroll and Smith, mistakenly, have contrasted members of different distinctions.

Exposing such confusion has important theoretical consequences. The onlooker theorist, I submit, now faces a dilemma, for he owes us an explanation of the sense in which we, as narrative readers, viewers, or listeners, can be «onlookers» of a narrative's situation. If the imagining is non-iconic, then there is no point of view from which to be onlookers. If the imagining is iconic, then we are *in* the situation, and hence, *pace* the onlooker theorist, we are participants in the imagined scene even when our imagining is merely acentral.

Iconically Imagining Experiences

Wollheim's characterization of acentral, iconic imagining is however somewhat problematic, for he characterizes those iconic mental states that fail to be central as not possessing a point of view, specifically, a point of view internal to what they represent. That is, he claims that acentral imagining occurs, not only not from the inside of any dramatis persona, but not from the inside even of the imagined scene. However, I submit, there is no need, when characterizing acentral imagining, to add the latter proviso. Claiming that acentral imagining occurs not from the inside of any dramatis persona is sufficient to differentiate it from central imagining. That is, I propose that all iconic mental states, whether instances of central or acentral imagining, be recognized as being from a point of view, specifically a point of view internal to the imagined scene.

Among the multiple reasons to characterize all iconic mental states the way I recommend, there is the difficulty of distinguishing points of view internal to an imagined scene from those external to it. Consider that a point of view external to an imagined scene is still internal to one's imaginative project, if there is, of course, a workable distinction between imagined scene and imaginative project.

What distinguishes central imagining from acentral imagining, I propose, is that the former but not the latter represents, from the inside, a dramatis persona's thinking, valuing, desiring, feeling, in sum the persona's experience. Such a characterization allows us to reply to an objection that Wollheim himself seems to have envisaged, namely, that there is not a substantial difference between central and acentral imagining but just a difference in point of view between two imaginative acts that are otherwise indistinguishable from each other. By contrast, in my account, the two imaginative acts, though both iconic mental states, are shown to be usefully distinguished

from each other, for central, but not acentral, imagining has the characteristic of requiring an evaluative/conative/emotive switch.

The suggested taxonomy of modes of imagination allows to reformulate the participant view in terms of *iconic imagining*. As readers or viewers or listeners of a narrative, we are often participants in the imagined scene, iconically representing it to ourselves (narrative participation). At times, and for selected experiential dimensions, the scene is *centrally* imagined, i.e., iconically imagined from the inside of some character (character participation).

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Criticism and aesthetic judgment

ANDY HAMILTON

Abstract

This paper addresses Richard Wollheim's treatment of criticism in his essay «Criticism as retrieval». His central thesis is that «The task of criticism is the reconstruction of the creative process, where [that] process must in turn be thought of as something not stopping short of, but terminating on, the work of art itself». His article addresses a central problem in criticisnt captured by his characterisation of «One heroic proposal...the aim of which is to ensure the democracy of art, [which defines] the ideal critic as one whose cognitive stock is empty, or who brings to bear on the work of art zero krowledge. belief, and concepts». Wollheim regards this proposal as quite impracticable, having little to recommend it except its democratic aim. I explore this democratic motivation and produce a more convincing vindicatien of it. I argue that critical judgnient is an essential devolopment of aesthetic judgment. and that it is democratic while recognising the value of expertise. Wollheim's retrieval thesis tends towards what I eharacterise as an elitist model of criticism. which sheuld be rejected. I develop a Wittgensteinian account ofcriticism which employs the concept of «seeing-as». and also argue against Wollheini's apparent neglect of the intrinsicallv evaluative nature of criticism. I conelude by giving a partial defénce of the cLaim that criticism is essential to aesthetic judgrnent.

Aesthetics, Perception & Discrimination: A Line of Wollheim's Developed

*ROBERT HOPKINS**

§1 The Issue

Wollheim criticizes the '**Presentational Theory**': the view that what is of aesthetic significance in an item must be accessible to 'simple observation'[1].

I describe the internal structure of that view. RW's criticisms apply differentially to its various claims. I seek to develop one criticism farther. Perhaps the view's other claims can be defended against RW's other criticisms.

The **issue of doubles** comprises Goodman's two questions:

Q1. Can there be an aesthetic difference for a subject S at a time t between two objects he is unable to distinguish perceptually at t?

Q2. Can there be any aesthetic difference at all between two objects if no one is ever able to tell them apart?

Presentationalism reformulated:

P1. Aesthetically significant features of an object must show up in our experience of it.

P2. A feature figures in our experience only if we can tell, on that basis, when it is present and when it is not.

Presentationalism motivates answering Q1 and Q2 negatively. But the issue of doubles also helps give Presentationalism clearer content.

Goodman's answer to Q1:

> In short, although I cannot tell the pictures apart merely by looking at them now, the fact that the left-hand one is the original and the right-hand one a forgery constitutes an aesthetic difference between them for me now because knowledge of this fact (1) stands as evidence that there may be a difference between them that I can learn to perceive, (2) assigns the present looking a role as training toward such a perceptual discrimination, and (3) makes consequent demands that modify and differentiate my present experience in looking at the two pictures[2].

But what exactly does Goodman have in mind?

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1   Wollheim, R., *Art and its Objects*. Cambridge University Press, 1980². P. 21.
2   Goodman, N., *The Languages of Art*. Cambridge, Hackett, 1976, p. 105.

§2 Goodman's first answer elaborated-Walton and Wollheim

Knowing that two pictures differ, says Goodman,

> ...indicates to some extent the kind of scrutiny to be applied now, the comparisons and contrasts to be made in the imagination, and the relevant associations to be brought to bear[3].

This elaborated by appeal to Walton's 'Categories of Art'.
The resulting view in effect generalizes Wollheim's use of Gombrich on expression[4].

§3 Goodman's first answer completed

The Goodman-Walton-Wollheim answer targets P2.
It faces the **problem of relevance**: naturally, experience is permeable to thought, but why think that its being so shows anything about the *aesthetic qualities* of the doubles?
Wollheim does not address the problem. What Walton has to say about the problem in general does not help in the context of doubles. Goodman's response is more helpful: the relevant thoughts are those engendering the *future* ability to discriminate the two objects.

§4 Goodman on the Second Question

However, as Goodman sees, this leaves Q2 pressing.
His response:

> Yet suppose we are nevertheless pressed with the question whether, if proof *were* given [that 'no one will ever be able to see any difference' (p.106)], there would then be any aesthetic difference for me between the pictures. This will still give our questioner no comfort. For the net result would be that if no difference between the pictures can in fact be perceived, then the existence of an aesthetic difference between them will rest entirely upon what is or is not proved by means other than merely looking at them. This hardly supports the contention that there can be no aesthetic difference without a perceptual difference[5].

How can this constitute a reply?
Accepting NG's positive answer to Q1, Presentationalism can still answer Q2 negatively, by retreating to: P1 &

> P2* A feature figures in S's experience of O only if S can *or could come to* discriminate the presence of the feature from its absence.

Nothing NG says shows this combination of views to be incoherent.

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3   Goodman, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-5.
4   Wollheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-31.
5   Goodman, *op. cit.* p. 108.

§5 A Different Answer to the Second Question

Why not solve the problem of relevance by appeal to *how things really are*?
This view settles Q2 positively. Its positive answer to Q1 also differs from NG's.
It leaves the Presentationalist with P1 &

P2⁺ A feature figures in S's experience of O only if O really possesses that feature.

This Presentationalism is compatible with our intuitions about the possibility of aesthetic differences between even perfect doubles.
However, even assuming P1, is this view defensible?

- (i) Does it beg the question? Given the overall dialectic, I think not.
- (ii) One way to bring this out is by comparison with closely related issues in epistemology.
- (iii) Does the view fail to allow that we can have reason to expose ourselves to one of a pair of doubles, rather than the other?

Only if, quite generally, we consider the veridicality of an experience, not to be, in itself, a reason for preferring it to its non-veridical equivalent.

Looking Back on Formalism

*DEREK MATRAVERS**

There are three parts to the paper, 'Looking Back on Formalism'. The first considers Richard Wollheim's paper, 'On Formalism and Pictorial Representation'. In this paper, Wollheim argues against the version of formalism proposed by Clive Bell and Roger Fry. These theorists argued that the value of a painting was borne by its formal properties. Wollheim's argument is that such a claim requires some way in which the formal properties can be distinguished from the rest. One pre-theoretically plausible way of doing this would be to distinguish the two dimensional surface properties from the three dimensional properties of the volumes in pictorial space. Wollheim draws on his work on 'seeing-in' to argue that, if we see the surface as the surface of a picture, we cannot help see into pictorial space. If the formalist concedes this, they could try to argue that the relevant distinction is between the content of pictorial space conceived as abstract volumes, and the content

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of pictorial space conceived as figurative properties. Wollheim has a further argument against this. If we conceive the contents of pictorial space as abstract volumes, much will remain undetermined. For example, it might only be by seeing a particular part of the canvas as a jug that we see a line on the canvas as taking us back into pictorial space from than coming out towards us.

Observe the earthenware object that lies on the ground on the left-hand side of the picture. As our eyes alight on it, we recognise it as a domestic vessel. At this point the beliefs that we have about such utensils confirm us in seeing the dark circle on its body as an aperture opening inwards rather than as a protuberance pushing outwards.

Hence, Wollheim concludes that the formalist is unable to draw a principled distinction between formal and non-formal properties.

The paper does not dispute these conclusions. The only point of dispute is whether the formalist needs to isolate, in the sense of separate, formal from non-formal properties. The paper argues that the formalist needs something weaker. If, as they surely would, formalists argue that formal properties are the spatial and colour relations between volumes in pictorial space (even if those volumes are conceived figuratively), than those relational properties cannot be isolated from those volumes. However, Wollheim's general point (that some principled way of drawing the distinction needs to be found) is surely right.

The second part of the paper looks at Clive Bell's book, *Art* . Bell christened the bearer of value in a painting 'significant form'. It argues that Bell was motivated to find a property that was 'common and peculiar' to all works of visual art. That is, Bell was essentially making a mistake of classification. He thought that the classification of objects as art required that there was some single property possessed by all and only those objects. Alternatives he did not consider included that the objects might have a distinctive function, or embody a distinctive relation between their properties. Significant form comprised of the spatial and colour relations between the volumes in pictorial space, considered non-figuratively. Although Bell thought that figuration was irrelevant to the value of a painting as a painting, he did not think a painting was the poorer for being figurative.

This raises the question of what Bell thought was the relation between figuration and significant form. In the paper, I draw on the work of Bell and also the work of Roger Fry —a contemporary of Bell who was a major influence on him to argue the following. Bell thought that if an artist set himself or herself the project of producing an object that possessed significant form they were bound to fail. They needed some other project 'of passionate import' (such as producing a figurative painting) from which properties of significant form would emerge. In a review of *Art*, Fry raises the question of why this should be so: 'But surely this significant form, with all its possible implications of ultimate reality, this form about which Mr. Bell himself rises to genuine artistic passion, is a thing of passionate import.'. That is, why should an artist paint a canvas with the sole purpose of exhibiting significant form? Hence, having concluded (with Wollheim) that the formalist position is untenable, the paper also argues that Bell's position does not make sense even considered on its own terms.

The paper then investigates the relation between Fry and Bell's work, and the artists who knew them. Fry and Bell were members of the Bloomsbury Group, which included a number of painters. It is surprising, given Fry and Bell's views, that Bloomsbury paintings remained predominantly figurative. There was some abstract work; both Vanessa Bell and Duncan Grant were producing abstract canvasses around 1914 (when *Art* was published). However, in the main, the painters seem to have used figurative qualities as a means for experimenting with form. In other words (whether it was Bell influencing the painters, or the painters influencing Bell) they seem to have seized on the role Bell allows for figuration. However, in a neat reflection of the theory, they seem to have

found this restricted role for figuration inadequate. Vanessa Bell is reported by her son Quentin Bell as finding in abstraction insufficient compensation for what she regarded as the loss of subject matter. By 1921, Fry wrote, in a review of Picasso:

> there is nothing inherently impossible in the venture to create expressive form out of the minimum of representation possible, but when we come to consider the quality of what is expressed I confess that personally I feel some disappointment...We are intrigued, pleased, charmed, but hardly ever as deeply moved as we are by pictures in which representation plays a larger part.

It seems that, neither in theory nor in the practice of painting and art criticism, can formal properties be the sole sources of value in art.

The third part of the paper looks at a more recent formalist theory, that of Clement Greenberg. The underlying thought is as follows:

«The essence of modernism lies...in the use of the characteristic methods of a discipline to criticise the discipline itself, not in order to subvert it but in order to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence».

Hence, the task of a modernist painting is to draw attention to the difference between painting and other activities such as entertainment and therapy. This is done by drawing attention to those properties of painting (paradigmatically the properties of the support such as flatness) not shared by activities that are not art, and activities that are art but are not painting. This interpretation of Greenberg faces several problems, of which the paper picks out two. First, has Greenberg picked out the right properties as those to which modernist painting should direct our attention? Second, have we reason to believe that drawing attention to these properties will result in artistically valuable objects?

Wollheim considered both of these in his essay 'The Work of Art as Object'. There he makes the point that, in order to pick out an object of attention, the kind of surface to which our attention is directed needs to be specified: 'In talking of a surface, the theory is irreducibly and ineliminably referring to the *surface of a painting*'. Hence, the question arises as to what it is to attend to a surface as a surface of a painting. The answer to this would allow Wollheim to use the same argument against Greenberg as he used above against Bell. The second problem for Greenberg concerned the value of the objects that would be produced as a result of the task set for modernist painting. It is difficult to see that there is anything valuable about the experience of that nature of the support considered as such.

The interpretation of Greenberg's essay is of his account having two stages. First, 'using the characteristic methods of the discipline to criticise the discipline itself', and second, the claim that this is done by drawing attention to the properties of the support. Some commentators have argued that these two stages should be prized apart . This leaves the possibility of different arguments for the second that will link modernist painting with formal properties.

Michael Fried, in his essay 'Art and Objecthood', accepts the first stage identified above, but provides a broader second stage:

> [The essence of painting is] that which compels conviction —[it] is largely determined by, and therefore changes continually in response to, the vital work of the recent past. The essence of painting is not something irreducible. Rather, the task of the modernist painter is to discover those conventions which, at a given moment, *alone* are capable of establishing the work's identity as a painting.

We can see from earlier arguments that formalism does not follow from 'engaging with the demands of the specific medium' or 'discovering those conventions ... capable of establishing the work's identity as a painting'. Formal properties are no more central to the identity of a painting than non-formal properties. If, however, you drop the claim that this task favours formal properties above figurative properties, one might fairly ask whether the task Fried sets is a distinctively Modernist one, or whether it is simply a continuation of the task painters have always set for themselves.

I think the task Fried sets is distinctively modernist (with some formalist shades). Artists (particularly in post-war New York) did foreground properties of paintings such as the nature of the support in a way that had not been particularly characteristic of painters previously. The question is how best to describe the concentration on formal properties by painters. The strongest claim is that it was the best response, or even a *necessary* response, for painting to make at that time. There is also a weaker claim —which can even be found in 'Modernist Painting'— to the effect that, if painters want their work to stand comparison with the great art of the past, then foregrounding the nature of the support is *the* way the achieve that end.

In a way this is a puzzling claim. Why should it be *the* way? Why not —for example— continue doing what painters in the past were doing, but with modern subject matter? On the other hand, foregrounding the nature of the support is *a* way of standing comparison with the paintings of the past, and *a* way that resulted in some valuable works of art. The paper speculates that, unlike Bell, Greenberg was onto something. His theory did seem to capture the ground on which many good works of art were being produced. Of course, it might be —as has often been pointed out— that modernism established the canon, hence appealing to the canon to support modernism is blatantly circular. It might also be that the theory was a post-hoc rationalisation of works that could be judged good on independent, more traditional grounds. What are the grounds for the feeling that abstraction rather than figuration was *the* appropriate way to paint at that time?

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