

Metaphors for Metaphors

JUDIT FERENCZY
 English Department
 Kodolányi János College
 Szabadságharcos út 59
 Székesfehérvár8000
 Hungary

ABSTRACT

This paper rises the issue of how the concept of metaphor is understood in three views of linguistics and/or philosophical theorizing of metaphor. The theories to be considered are: the interaction theory (as represented by Black 1993), the pragmatic theory (as discoursed by Searle 1993) and the cognitivist theory (as elaborated by Lakoff and Johnson 1980 and Lakoff 1993). The paper goes even further by taking into consideration the metaphorical ways in which the different authors talk about metaphor. The main findings of the study are the following: (1) scientific language is deeply metaphorical; (2) despite the radically different views on metaphor expressed by the three schools, the metaphorical ways of dealing with metaphor is strikingly similar; and (3) the methods used in cognitive linguistics prove successful even on this metalinguistic level.

KEY WORDS: metaphor for metaphor, meta-metaphor, comparison theory, interaction theory, pragmatic theory, cognitivist theory

RESUMEN

Este artículo plantea el tema de cómo el concepto de metáfora se percibe desde tres perspectivas de la lingüística y/o de la teoría filosófica de la metáfora. Las teorías a tratar son: la teoría de la interacción (representada por Black 1993), la teoría pragmática (planteadas por Searle 1993) y la teoría cognitivista (elaborada por Lakoff y Johnson 1980 y Lakoff 1993). El artículo va más allá al tomar en consideración las formas metafóricas en las que los distintos autores hablan de la metáfora. Los principales hallazgos del estudio son los siguientes: (1) el lenguaje científico es profundamente metafórico; (2) a pesar de los puntos de vista radicalmente opuestos con respecto a la metáfora expresados por estas tres escuelas, las formas metafóricas de tratar la metáfora son notablemente similares; y (3) los métodos empleados en la lingüística cognitiva resultan ser eficaces incluso en este nivel metalingüístico.

PALABRAS CLAVE: metáfora de metáfora, meta-metáfora, teoría comparatista, teoría de la interacción, teoría pragmática, teoría cognitivista

I. INTRODUCTION

The presupposition in **connection** with scientific language has long **been** that it has to be literal, **because** this is the only way reality can be described in a properly - precise and unambiguous, in one word - objective way. No tropes or other examples of figurative language are acceptable in a desirably testable characterization of the surrounding world. This paper is meant to **prove** that scientific language is much less literal than it is thought to be.

The most **intriguing** way to **indicate** this **turned** out to be the promising possibility of looking at the different theories of metaphor just to find that even when discussing metaphor the scientists cannot get rid of metaphorical expressions. To notice this we need a certain meta-linguistic attitude, which focuses not only on *what* is said but **also** on *how* it is conveyed.

As a foundation to my analysis, in the **first** part of my paper **I** will **provide** a short summary of **three** different theories of metaphor: the interaction theory (based on Black 1993), the pragmatic theory (based on Searle 1993 and Sadock 1993) and the cognitivist theory (based on Lakoff and **Johnson** 1980 and Lakoff 1993). In the second part **I** will present a detailed analysis of the metaphors used for metaphors - which **I** will **call** *meta-metaphors* - by the above mentioned linguists. The methods used in the analysis are cognitivist ones, an approach which **I** myself consider the closest to the **nature** of metaphor and the best to **serve** my purposes.

II. METAPHOR AS A CONCEPT IN A VARIETY OF THEORIES

The interaction theory

It is **true** of **all** the theories **I** am going to discuss that they do not accept the traditional Aristotelian view of metaphor as grasping a similarity between two objects. In this so-called comparison theory metaphor is nothing more than a concocted **simile** stating that an object resembles another in **certain** clear aspects. In this view the speaker could **have** as well formulated his description of the object in question in literal statements, which express exactly the same idea in a much more precise way. In other words, any metaphor can be paraphrased, that is, the figurative expression can any time be **communicated** in a **down-to-earth** literal way. The speaker's using **tropological** expressions is a **mere whim**, a deviation, an aberration, so metaphor is parasitic on 'normal usage'. Metaphors are vague, inessential frills, which can be appropriate for the purposes of politicians and poets, but not for 'serious people' **like** scientists.

The interaction theory - summarised by Black in his 1993 work (see bibliography) - **leaves** behind many axioms of the comparison theory while keeping others. For example, it considers metaphor to **mediate some kind of analogy** or **structural** correspondence between two concepts, saying that this is the correct insight behind the classical comparison view of metaphor as an ellipticated **simile**. But it continues by saying that «**Implication is** not the same as covert identity: **Looking** at a scene through blue spectacles is different from **comparing** that scene with something **else**» (Black 1993:30). Moreover, metaphor in Black's view is not replaceable, by **uttering** it the speaker means just what he said and feels he had a 'flash of insight' rather than just a perception of a similitude.

The reason why the interaction theory is called so is that the focus is not placed on the resemblance between the two **nodes** of the metaphor but, on the contrary, upon the verbal opposition and interaction between the two semantic contents. The literal-figurative distinction, on the other hand, is still kept: in Black's view the tacit knowledge of the literal meaning induces a feeling of dissonance or tension between the literal **and** metaphorical interpretations of the metaphor.

Another **important** issue the interaction theory raises is the question of the so-called 'dead metaphors'. Black **does** not consider dead metaphors to be metaphors: «This [i.e. the trite opposition between 'dead' and 'live' metaphors] is no more **helpful** than, say, treating a corpse as a special case of a person: A so-called dead metaphor is not a metaphor at all, but merely an expression that no longer has a pregnant metaphorical **use**» (Black 1993:25).

The interaction theory **also** introduces the idea that metaphors are not necessarily only based on pre-existing connections between two concepts, but can **also generate** new knowledge and insight by changing relationships between the **things** designated. To **illustrate** how metaphors can actually **create** similarities Black uses a metaphor: he asks, 'Did the other side of the moon exist before it was **seen**?'. The answer is undoubtedly 'Yes'. To the question 'Did the view of Mount Everest from a point one hundred feet above its **summit** exist before anybody had **seen** that view?' the answer is again 'Yes', but only in a counterfactual way: If anybody had **been** in the position to view the **mountain** from the point specified, it would **have** looked the same as it **does** now from an aeroplane. If, then, we speak about views, it is logical that we **also** need viewers, and the view that is actually **seen** is a fact about the mountain as well as about the viewer. Therefore, metaphors are cognitive instruments **indispensable** for perceiving connections that, once perceived, are then **truly** present (Black 1993: 36-37).

In sum, the interaction theory views metaphor as the interaction between two semantic **fields** expressed by the two end-points of a metaphor; its special effect coming from the tension between the literal and the figurative meanings; metaphors **have** a strong *raison d'être* since they are not replaceable and they can **create** new relationships between two concepts.

The pragmatic theory

Just **like** interactionalists, pragmatists - **primarily** Searle 1993 and Sadock 1993 - also stand off by opposing their views to the traditional comparison theory. In their view, too, metaphors are essentially not paraphrasable, **because** in most of the cases there is no literal expression that conveys exactly what we mean, **because** «without using the metaphorical expression, we **will** not reproduce the semantic content **which occurred** in the hearer's comprehension of the **utterance**» (Searle 1993:111). If we try to paraphrase a metaphor, we either do not **find** a corresponding literal statement or, even if we do, it is somehow inadequate, **something is lost** in meaning. **Similarity** is viewed as a vacuous predicate, **because** any two **things** are similar in **some** respect or another, and how do we know exactly which respect the speaker has **in** mind when uttering a metaphor? (Searle's example is *Sally is a block of ice*. where there do not seem to be any literal similarities between **objects** which are cold and people who are unemotional.) But we still understand the speaker perfectly, and **the way this is done is** exactly what pragmatists are interested in.

Searle compares metaphors to irony and indirect speech acts in the respect that **in** all three cases there is a break between what the speaker says (**i.e.** sentence meaning) and what he means (**i.e.** utterance meaning). The pattern to this is:

'S is P' means in fact 'S is R',

where the first, that is, the sentence meaning, is never metaphorical, while the second, the utterance meaning, can be metaphorical. The way metaphors are understood is the following: when the utterance **is** defective if taken literally, the hearer **looks** for an utterance meaning that differs from the sentence meaning and that is no longer defective (Searle 1993:103). To do this, speaker and hearer must share (i) certain **principles** that associate the P term with a set of possible values of R, and (ii) **some** strategies that enable them, given their knowledge of the S term, to restrict the range of possible values of R to the actual value, where only those possible values of R which determine possible values of S can be actual values of R (Searle 1993:107).

While Searle - although conceiving of metaphor as a 'roundabout' (1993:89) way of expression - **insists** that metaphors are intrinsically irreplaceable, Sadock **sees** metaphor as an indirect way of assenting something which might **have been** communicated directly in terms of the conventions of language (1993:43). In explaining this, Sadock states that metaphor appears to be in **conflict** with the Gricean cooperative **principle**, therefore the hearer is forced to seek a figurative, but cooperative, intent behind the utterance (ibid.).

What made me list the two authors under the same heading is that both seem to push metaphor out of the realm of descriptive linguistics: Searle suggests that metaphor is not a question of language per se but one of language use; Sadock even risks the statement that **all** noniiteral speech falls **outside** the domain of synchronic linguistics, **because** the basis of, say, metaphor **is** a kind of indirection that **is** shared with nonianguage **behavior** (Sadock 1993:42). In this view, the problem of metaphor is strictly a **pragmatic** question.

Pragmatists, too, **have** something to say about dead metaphors: Sadock considers it a commonplace that they were **«alive and kicking at some time in the past»** (1993:44) (note that **in** formulating this he places the phenomenon **in** the realm of diachronic linguistics); Searle goes even **further** by saying oxymoronically that **«dead metaphors have lived on»** (1993:88). This **means** in his interpretation that they **have become** dead **through** continual use, but their continual use is a clue that they satisfy **some** semantic need.

To sum up, in the pragmatic theory metaphor is conceived as the relationship between what is said and what is meant to be said; it is not paraphrasable, but it is essentially not a question of language itself, but one of language use, therefore it is not a proper subject of traditional linguistics.

The cognitivist theory

The most **strikingly** new idea of cognitive linguistics - represented by Lakoff and Johnson 1980 and Lakoff 1993 - is the falsity of the whole distinction between literal and figurative meaning (Lakoff 1993:205). In a thorough and detailed **manner**, Lakoff **illustrates** very convincingly in his 1993 **article** that a great many common concepts of ours are metaphorical and that metaphor **is** a **fixed** pan of our conceptual system (ibid.).

The cognitivist view takes over and develops many ideas of the theories described above while **rejecting** others. From the interaction theory it agrees with the idea that metaphors can **create** new similarities, and that there is a **structural** correspondence between the two concepts a metaphorical relationship is applied to. On the other hand, it drops the idea that dead metaphors are not real metaphors: conventional metaphors are considered especially interesting for the study of metaphor, **because** they **reveal** certain fundamental

processes of thinking, and **fit** into a whole range of correspondences **also** present in novel metaphors.

From the pragmatic theory cognitivists adopt the idea that metaphor can be interpreted as a nonlinguistic behaviour by saying that metaphor is not **simply** a matter of language but of thought and reason (Lakoff 1993:203). However, they reject the somewhat simplifying view that metaphor would just be a **mere** problem of language use. **In** the cognitive interpretation metaphor is a central **part** of synchronic linguistics **because** much of our semantic system is metaphorical (Lakoff 1993:239).

In the cognitivist view metaphor **means** understanding one domain of experience (i.e. target domain) in **terms** of a very different domain of experience (i.e. source domain). The pattern is:

'A is B'

where A is more abstract, less concrete, and B is less abstract, more concrete. Lakoff's 'A is B' is very much different from Searle's 'S is P', **because** 'S is P' is an actual statement expressing a metaphorical relationship between two actually appearing *objects* of the world, while 'A is B' is a metaphorical relationship between two *concepts*, which never appears like this in real-life statements but which has many different linguistic surface-manifestations which relate to each-other in a systematic way. For example, one never encounters the statement THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS - which is an 'A is B' relation - in actual real-life conversations, but one may very well hear utterances such as:

What is the *foundation* of your theory? The theory needs more *support*. We need to *construct* a *strong* argument instead of that *shaky* one. We *have* put together the *framework* of the theory.

These are surface **manifestations** of one and the **same** underlying *conceptual* metaphor (and note, none of them are of the structure 'S is P', but could be **reformulated** as such, if needed).

Cognitivists **also** noticed that metaphors **have** an **inner** structure called *mapping*, which is a set of ontological correspondences between the **two** domains of experience. In these mappings the so-called Invariance **Principle rules**: the mappings preserve the cognitive topology of **the source** domain, consistent with the **inherent structure** of the target domain (Lakoff 1993:215).

The **insight** which gives the cognitivist view great credibility **and** reliability is that these conceptual metaphors are not isolated, but **systematic**: **separate** metaphors are naturally grouped in our conceptual system and, together with relations based on other **principles** (like metonymy). they form so-called *idealized cognitive models (ICMs)*, which structure our thinking and understanding of the world. **Also**, these metaphors do not float **in** the air, but are motivated by being grounded **in** nonmetaphorical experiences.

To illustrate this, let us turn back to Searle's example of an 'S is P' relation: *Sally is a block of ice*. Searle correctly states that there is no literal **similarity** between **objects** that are **cold** and people who are unemotional, but **does** not give a plausible explanation for why the speaker would use this utterance to characterize Sally. Lakoff comes up with a very convincing one: he **notices** that there is a conceptual metaphor of the form 'A is B' that gives rise to a whole range of metaphorical expressions: AFFECTION IS WARMTH (and the

opposite INDIFFERENCE IS COLD) (Lakoff 1993:239).

We received a *warm* welcome. Our friendship has come to be just *lukewarm*.
She is absolutely *frigid*. She sent him an *icy* glance. He was *cool* to me today.

In sum, in the cognitivist approach metaphor is interpreted as understanding one (target) domain in terms of another (source) domain of experience in a way which is systematic and motivated, and which structures our conceptual system and helps us reflect our knowledge from more delineated concepts to less tangible ones in the understanding of the world outside.

III. META-METAPHORS

From a theoretical account let us now turn to a more practical question: what are the metaphors linguists belonging to the above mentioned schools use when talking about metaphor? Is there a basic difference between the ways schools so different in nature use metaphors for metaphors? In seeking an answer to these questions I applied the cognitivist method of grasping the meta-metaphors in 'A is B' structures. In the first unit of this part of my paper I am going to present meta-metaphors that appear in both the cognitivist and the non-cognitivist (interactional or pragmatic) approaches. The second unit will consist of meta-metaphors which only partially overlap in the two kinds of approaches, while the third unit will enumerate meta-metaphors which are totally different, sometimes even contradictory. The examples are taken from Lakoff and Johnson 1980 (hereafter LJ), Lakoff 1993 (hereafter L), Lakoff and Tumer 1989 (hereafter LT) and Black 1993 (hereafter B), Searle 1993 (hereafter Se), Sadock 1993 (hereafter Sa), Shibbes 1971 (hereafter Sh), Kuhn 1993 (hereafter K), Van Noppen and Hols 1990 (hereafter VH) respectively. Groups of examples preceded by 'I.' are cognitivist examples, those preceded by 'II.' are non-cognitivist ones. The Arabic numerals following the abbreviations indicate page numbers.

Overlapping meta-metaphors

The most general meta-metaphor structuring the way linguists on both sides think about metaphors is METAPHOR IS A MEANS. This meta-metaphor is a manifestation of the more comprehensive event structure, which goes like this:

States are locations (bounded regions in space).
Changes are movements (into or out of bounded regions).
Actions are self-propelled movements.
Purposes are destinations.
Means are paths (to destinations).
Difficulties are **impediments** to motion. (...)
Long term, purposeful activities are journeys. (Lakoff 1993:220)

The metaphors we have to do with fit into this general structure like this: the two most basic human activities are conceptualized as 1) ACTIVITY IS WORK and 2) ACTIVITY IS MOTION. And since when using metaphors we are engaged in the activity

of understanding, along the above lines understanding can be conceptualized in the following way: (i) ACTIVITY IS WORK / UNDERSTANDING IS WORK / METAPHOR IS AN IMPLEMENT and (ii) ACTIVITY IS MOTION / UNDERSTANDING IS A JOURNEY /METAPHOR IS A PATH, where both IMPLEMENT and PATH are **subcases** of the concept MEANS. ((ii) is discussed **later**.)

METAPHOR IS AN IMPLEMENT therefore is a **common** meta-metaphor in both camps of linguists:

I. Metaphors are *tools* / devices (LJ193) for understanding, they can be used / handled / applied and they *serve purposes* (LT xi). They are *mechanisms*(L202) (i.e. more sophisticated *instruments*). We understand abstract concepts by *means* of (LJ115) metaphor. Metaphors give us a *handle* (LJ124) on things.

II. Metaphors can be used (B22). They are versatile and *effective* (B25). They can be relatively dispensable (B26), or can lend *themselves* to elaboration (B26). Metaphor is a cognitive *instrument* (B31) which *functions* / *operates* / *works* (B22). Metaphors *express* (= press out) thoughts. They *satisfy* semantic needs (Sa48).

A subtype of METAPHOR IS AN IMPLEMENT is METAPHOR IS A VISUAL INSTRUMENT, which is pan of the very generally applied UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING metaphor mapped in the following manner:

UNDERSTANDING	IS	SEEING
The person who tries to understand something	corresponds to	the person who makes use of his organ of sight
Ideas to be understood	correspond to	objects to be seen
METAPHORS	ARE	VISUAL INSTRUMENTS

I. Metaphors give insight *in* vague concepts (LJ7). They *highlight* some aspects of concepts while hiding (I.e. *casting* shadow on) others (LJ61). Metaphors do not **only** *indicate* (LJ135) **similarities**, but **also** *reflect* (LJ46) correspondences.

II. Metaphors present insight (B21), *project* implications (B28), they are ontologically *illuminating* (B39), they focus on (B39) conceptual systems. Metaphors are often vague (Se96) and obscure (B20). Metaphor forces us to see (Sh16) reality in a **certain** way, it *clarifies* things (Sh20).

Note the slight difference between the **two** groups of examples: in the cognitivist one metaphors are always clear and **bright**, while in the noncognitivist one they are sometimes vague and obscure, a difference which iconically shows the degree of transparency of the

problem of metaphor in the two approaches.

Another meta-metaphor that can be found on both sides is THE CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM IS A BUILDING / METAPHOR IS ITS FRAMEWORK (with a structure of its own):

I. Metaphors are a *fixed part* (L208) of our conceptual system. They *arefundamental* (L229) in our thinking, we *base* our actions on metaphors which *underlie* everyday expressions (L204). The *system of metaphors is built into* (LJ64) the conceptual system, they *structure* our concepts (LJ46). Metaphors *establish* correspondences (LJ96), they are *grounded* (LJ64) in experience. The system of metaphors itself has a tight *inner structure* (L206), *internal consistency* (LJ43), with *portions* (LJ111). Metaphors need empirical *support* (L246), with which they can *serve* as the *basis* (LJ55) for novel metaphors, that is, *extensions*. Metaphors *sharply delineate* (LJ55) abstract concepts.

II. Metaphor has *grounds* and *relations to its grounding* (B19). Metaphors can be *affirmed* (i.e. made firm) (B30). Metaphors *have* a *basis* of their own (Sa42) with *underlying principles* (Sa42). Is metaphor an *edifice* that *rests* on the *rock bottom* of literal similes (Se97)? Metaphor is *deeply embedded* (i.e. firmly fixed in a mass) in our mode of sensibility (Se99). Metaphors *arefundamental* to science and *have* a *wide bearing* (K538). Metaphor *establishes* links between language and the world (K539). Metaphors are *deep* in our communicative system (VH3).

We can easily observe that this is the most widely used meta-metaphor in both the cognitivist and the noncognitivist works, which on its pan again *proves* how 'deeply embedded' metaphor is in our way of *thinking*.

Partially overlapping meta-metaphors

In this subchapter I am discussing meta-metaphors which *otherwise* correspond to *each-other* in the case of the two *parties*, but which *have* entailments or subtypes that are different and lead to imponent *conclusions*. The first very general meta-metaphor that appears is METAPHOR IS A HUMAN BEING. This has the following examples:

I. We *think* that *dead* metaphors are very much *alive* (LJ55). Metaphor is *robust*; it *embodies* generalizations (L205).

II. Metaphors can be *oíd* (B35) / *dead* / *alive and kicking* (Sa44) / *active* (B25).

A common subtype of this meta-metaphor is METAPHOR IS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR:

I. Metaphors *sanction* / *justify* / *dictate* / *allow* actions, they *have power over* us (LJ142).

II. Metaphors *have power* (B21) / *force* (26) / *an effect* (Sa43) / *immunity to contradiction* (Sa49). Metaphors can be *successful* / *failed* (B22) / *prove rich* (B26)

/ strike, seize (B31) / be feeble or strong (Se87) / achieve justification (Sh1). Metaphor commits the speaker to certain understandings (Se99), supplies and juxtaposes things (K533), captivates us (Sh3), determines how and what we see (Sh9), and it forces us to see reality in a certain way (Sh16).

It is quite **striking** that this SOCIAL SUPERIOR metaphor has a lot more **examples** in the works of noncognitivist than in those of cognitivist authors. This can be interpreted as showing that the problem of metaphor is 'more superior' or 'has more power on' those linguists who **deal** with metaphor in a more traditional and less effective way than on those who represent a contemporary theory of metaphor.

Another subtype of the HUMAN BEING metaphor is METAPHOR IS A CREATOR / PROGENITOR:

I. Metaphor *gives* meaning to form, it *isproductive* (LM21) in the *sense* that it *creates* new understanding (LJ235).

II. Metaphorical use can be *pregnant* (B25). Metaphor can *generate* knowledge (B38), can be a *surrogate* for verbal formulation (B38). Metaphors *call forth / create* similarities (K533).

But the HUMAN BEING meta-metaphor has a subtype which **only turns up** in the works of cognitivist authors: METAPHOR IS AN ASSISTANT.

I. Metaphors *do the job* of understanding *for us*, they *help us* to perform certain actions (LJ95). They *provide* understanding (LJ154).

It is not surprising to find this, **because** metaphor poses a problem for noncognitivist writers, **and** difficulties are not helpful, they are **impediments** to motion, that is, to action, that is, to understanding (as we **have seen** in the event **structure** presented by Lakoff in above).

Previously I **have** discussed the very general meta-metaphor METAPHOR IS A MEANS, which had **two subtypes**: METAPHOR IS AN IMPLEMENT and METAPHOR IS A PATH. The **latter is part** of the following mapping:

UNDERSTANDING	IS	A JOURNEY
The person who tries to understand something	corresponds to	the traveller.
The abstract concepts to be understood	correspond to	the destination.
The concepts and experiences we already possess	correspond to	the starting point.

METAPHOR

IS

A PATH

This meta-metaphor appears in the following forms:

I. Our *field* of research (L219) is metaphor. Is it true that one *gets away from* concrete physical experience, *starts from* the literal meaning and *winds up / arrives at* a metaphorical interpretation (L205)? We understand abstract concepts by way of / *via* metaphors. The theory of metaphor can be *traced back* to Reddy (L204). The *locus* of metaphor is thought (L204). Metaphor *goes beyond the realm* of conventional language (LJ54).

II. Metaphor is a way of **thinking** (VH3). Metaphor is *open-ended* (Se96). Metaphor communicates in an *indirect* way what might **have been** communicated *directly* (Sa43). 'S is P' is a *roundabout way* of asserting that 'S is R' (Se89). Metaphor is sometimes regarded as a *deviation from the normal route* (Sh11).

It is **worth** noting that, although the meta-metaphor appears in both types of writings, the way it **does** is very much different: for cognitivists the metaphor-path is direct, easy to follow, for noncognitivists it is indirect, a roundabout way, or even a deviation. This, again, shows a basic difference in the **attitudes** of the linguists.

In the common METAPHOR IS A MEANS / UNDERSTANDING IS A JOURNEY meta-metaphor two almost contradictory subtypes occur. In the case of cognitivists it is METAPHOR IS A MAP:

I. A *spatial* type of metaphor is *orientational* metaphor (LJ14).

Metaphors are expressed in **fixed patterns** (L210) / *schemas* (L214) / *projections* (L229) / *templates* (L233), which *fit* (LJ83) experience and preserve the cognitive *topology* (L215) of the target *domain*. Metaphors are *guides* (LJ156) for **future actions**.

In the case of noncognitivists it is METAPHOR IS AN OBSTACLE:

II. Metaphor is sometimes a *stumbling block in the path* of the linguist (Sa51). Metaphor is the *locus of semantic change* (Sa57). There is a *boundary* between literally and nonliterally conveyed communication (Sa53), a *limit where* meaning *leaves off and figuration begins* (Sa51). There are **also intractable** cases of metaphor (Sa51).

No comment is needed to explain how these **two** meta-metaphors show the way the two **parties deal** with metaphor.

Non-overlapping metaphors

There is a number of meta-metaphors which only appear in the works of either the cognitive or the noncognitive authors. In the former group **only** one but very **powerful** meta-metaphor can be found, and this is METAPHOR IS A SUBSTANCE / RESOURCE:

I. Metaphors *pervade* (LJ3) our way of thinking (like **smells** or fluids). Cultural values are *deeply entrenched* (LJ23) in metaphors (like **in** ground). Metaphors *suffuse* our thoughts (like colour or moisture), they can be *applied* (like ointments or glue) (LJ103) and they won't *mix* (LJ95). Metaphor is *widespread* and it is a *matter* of thought (L202). Like air, metaphor is *omnipresent*, *accessible* to everyone, *irreplaceable* and *indispensable* (LT xi). It is a rich *source* of elaboration (LJ61).

For noncognitivists metaphor is understood in the following metaphorical ways:

METAPHOR IS A DIFFERENT LANGUAGE / TERMINOLOGY
Metaphors **have** to be *translated* / *interpreted* / *explained* (Se98).

METAPHOR IS A HIDDEN OBJECT
We **have** to *spot* metaphors. We are *on the look-out* for metaphors (Se103)

?METAPHOR IS A GAME / PLAY
Metaphor cannot *begin* until the *referents of game* **have been** established (K537). The S term *plays an important role* in metaphor (Se104).

?METAPHOR IS AN ACCIDENT / MISTAKE
Some metaphors are *fatal* for the *simile* thesis (Se98).

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The very **first** conclusion to be drawn is that scientific language is deeply metaphorical. The data enumerated in the above pages **speak** for themselves, and the fact that the reader **does** not **easily** notice them is not to be explained by saying that they are not metaphorical, but that they are so natural and conventional that a meta-linguistic consciousness is needed to throw light on them.

Moreover, metaphors for metaphors can not only be found in **the works** of cognitive linguists, who celebrate the phenomenon of metaphor, but **also** in the scientific discourse of more or less traditional **writers**, who regard metaphor as either **improper** in scientific writing or not a **subject** to be treated in synchronic linguistics at **all**. Why cannot they free themselves of metaphor even when dealing with metaphor **itself**? **Because** metaphor helps them **understand** and express new ideas, **it serves** as a **handle** when **walking** on **swampy** soil.

It is **true** that throughout the analysis **I have been** using the **methodology** of cognitive linguistics, but **this** in itself is not an **explanation** for the **clarity** of the results. If there is nothing to find, the most fantastic **methods** will **also** fail to reach anything. But the picture of meta-metaphors delineated in my **paper** meets **all** the requirements cognitive linguistics has of metaphors, the network of meta-metaphors **is not haphazard** but systematic, it brings understanding to an abstract concept (**i.e.** metaphor) by relating **it** to more concrete concepts (**i.e.** implements, human beings, paths, maps etc.), of which we **have** a much **clearer** understanding and more basic, cultural or bodily, experience. **The** system of meta-metaphors is not accidental but has strong **links** with other metaphors **commonly** used in our thinking (**e.g.** the event structure).

Regarding the two-way distinction of meta-metaphors, namely that of cognitivist and noncognitivist approaches, the most eye-catching finding is that most of the meta-metaphors are similarly used by both **parties**, as presented in II. Is it not strange, one would ask, that when putting **forth** a totally new theory of metaphors, the metaphorical system cognitive linguists use is not radically different from the one used by traditional writers? I do not consider this a failure of my research, on the contrary, **I** would put this the other way round: the way noncognitivist authors use meta-metaphors is in total correspondence with what cognitivists *say* about how meta-metaphors work! **Despite** their basically different views, interactionalists and pragmatists display the same metaphorical system as cognitivists do, in other words, what noncognitivists say and do **in** their writing is contradictory. On the other hand, what cognitivists say and do is consistent.

This is to say that cognitive **linguistics** **throws** light on **certain** metaphorical processes in scientific discourse, be it traditional or not, which were present in the scientific discourse of earlier authors, too, but in an unconscious way.

A smaller group of meta-metaphors used by the two **parties** is of those which are different. I regard them as iconically showing the linguists' **attitude** towards their own topic: for cognitive theoreticians metaphor is an assistant, a map to orient their quest, an aid and a **resource** to help and feed them mentally, for noncognitivists it is an obstacle in their way, a language or terminology that has to be decoded, a hidden object that has to be found, that is, a problem not very easy to **solve** and understand.

As a **final** conclusion, **I find** the cognitivist position and its **methods** successful in dealing with metaphors for metaphors and with the phenomenon of metaphor **in** general.

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