La visión pragmatista de C.S. Peirce sobre la aserción

Jaime Alfaro Iglesias

Resumen


C.S. Peirce defendió una visión pragmatista de la aserción en términos de su efecto normativo. El presente artículo tiene dos objetivos. El primero es reconstruir y evaluar el argumento de Peirce a favor de la tesis de que aseverar una proposición es hacerse responsable de su verdad. El segundo es argumentar que Peirce interpretó “responsabilidad por la verdad” como la adquisición de un compromiso dialógico, a saber, el deber de defender la proposición aseverada dando razones ante desafío.

Palabras clave


pragmática de la aserción; pragmatismo; responsabilidad moral

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Referencias


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon/237661

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